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himself in favour of one party against the other； which course will
always be more advantageous than standing neutral； because if two of
your powerful neighbours e to blows； they are of such a character
that； if one of them conquers； you have either to fear him or not。 In
either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare
yourself and to make war strenuously； because； in the first case； if you
do not declare yourself； you will invariably fall a prey to the
conqueror； to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
conquered； and you will have no reasons to offer； nor anything to
protect or to shelter you。 Because he who conquers does not want
doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial； and he who
loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly； sword in hand；
court his fate。
Antiochus went into Greece； being sent for by the Aetolians to drive out
the Romans。 He sent envoys to the Achaeans； who were friends of the
Romans； exhorting them to remain neutral； and on the other hand the
Romans urged them to take up arms。 This question came to be discussed in
the council of the Achaeans； where the legate of Antiochus urged them to
stand neutral。 To this the Roman legate answered： 〃As for that which has
been said； that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to
interfere in our war； nothing can be more erroneous； because by not
interfering you will be left； without favour or consideration； the
guerdon of the conqueror。〃 Thus it will always happen that he who is not
your friend will demand your neutrality； whilst he who is your friend
will entreat you to declare yourself with arms。 And irresolute princes；
to avoid present dangers； generally follow the neutral path； and are
generally ruined。 But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour
of one side； if the party with whom he allies himself conquers； although
the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy； yet he is
indebted to him； and there is established a bond of amity； and men are
never so shameless as to bee a monument of ingratitude by oppressing
you。 Victories after all are never so plete that the victor must not
show some regard； especially to justice。 But if he with whom you ally
yourself loses； you may be sheltered by him； and whilst he is able he
may aid you； and you bee panions in a fortune that may rise again。
In the second case； when those who fight are of such a character that
you have no anxiety as to who may conquer； so much the more is it
greater prudence to be allied； because you assist at the destruction of
one by the aid of another who； if he had been wise； would have saved
him； and conquering； as it is impossible that he should not with your
assistance； he remains at your discretion。 And here it is to be noted
that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more
powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others； unless
necessity pels him； as is said above； because if he conquers you are
at his discretion； and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being
at the discretion of any one。 The Venetians joined with France against
the Duke of Milan； and this alliance； which caused their ruin； could
have been avoided。 But when it cannot be avoided； as happened to the
Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy； then
in such a case； for the above reasons； the prince ought to favour one of
the parties。
Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
courses； rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones；
because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
one trouble without running into another； but prudence consists in
knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles； and for choice to
take the lesser evil。
A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability； and to honour
the proficient in every art。 At the same time he should encourage his
citizens to practise their callings peaceably； both in merce and
agriculture； and in every other following； so that the one should not be
deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away
from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes； but the
prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and
designs in any way to honour his city or state。
Further； he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles
at convenient seasons of the year； and as every city is divided into
guilds or into societies； he ought to hold such bodies in esteem； and
associate with them sometimes； and show himself an example of courtesy
and liberality； nevertheless； always maintaining the majesty of his
rank； for this he must never consent to abate in anything。
CHAPTER XXII
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
THE choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince； and they
are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince。 And the
first opinion which one forms of a prince； and of his understanding； is
by observing the men he has around him； and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise； because he has known how to
recognize the capable and to keep them faithful。 But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him； for the prime error
which he made was in choosing them。
There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci； Prince of Siena； who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant。 Because there
are three classes of intellects： one which prehends by itself；
another which appreciates what others prehend； and a third which
neither prehends by itself nor by the showing of others； the first is
the most excellent； the second is good； the third is useless。 Therefore；
it follows necessarily that； if Pandolfo was not in the first rank； he
was in the second； for whenever one has judgment to know good or bad
when it is said and done； although he himself may not have the
initiative； yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant；
and the one he can praise and the other correct； thus the servant cannot
hope to deceive him； and is kept honest。
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never falls； when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours； and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything； such a man will never make a good servant； nor will you ever
be able to trust him； because he who has the state of another in his
hands ought never to think of himself； but always of his prince； and
never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned。
On the other to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him；
honouring him； enriching him； doing him kindnesses； sharing with him the
honours and cares； and at the same time let him see that he cannot sta