representative government-第80章

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ll　as　counted；　and　the　approbation　or　disapprobation　of　one　person　well　versed　in　the　subject　may　outweigh　that　of　thousands　who　know　nothing　about　it　at　all。　It　is　doubtless　a　useful　restraint　upon　the　immediate　rulers　that　they　can　be　put　upon　their　defence；　and　that　one　or　two　of　the　jury　will　form　an　opinion　worth　having　about　their　conduct；　though　that　of　the　remainder　will　probably　be　several　degrees　worse　than　none。　Such　as　it　is；　this　is　the　amount　of　benefit　to　India；　from　the　control　exercised　over　the　Indian　government　by　the　British　Parliament　and　people。　　　It　is　not　by　attempting　to　rule　directly　a　country　like　India；　but　by　giving　it　good　rulers；　that　the　English　people　can　do　their　duty　to　that　country；　and　they　can　scarcely　give　it　a　worse　one　than　an　English　Cabinet　Minister；　who　is　thinking　of　English；　not　Indian　politics；　who　seldom　remains　long　enough　in　office　to　acquire　an　intelligent　interest　in　so　complicated　a　subject；　upon　whom　the　factitious　public　opinion　got　up　in　Parliament；　consisting　of　two　or　three　fluent　speakers；　acts　with　as　much　force　as　if　it　were　genuine；　while　he　is　under　none　of　the　influences　of　training　and　position　which　would　lead　or　qualify　him　to　form　an　honest　opinion　of　his　own。　A　free　country　which　attempts　to　govern　a　distant　dependency；　inhabited　by　a　dissimilar　people；　by　means　of　a　branch　of　its　own　executive；　will　almost　inevitably　fail。　The　only　mode　which　has　any　chance　of　tolerable　success　is　to　govern　through　a　delegated　body　of　a　comparatively　permanent　character；　allowing　only　a　right　of　inspection；　and　a　negative　voice；　to　the　changeable　Administration　of　the　State。　Such　a　body　did　exist　in　the　case　of　India；　and　I　fear　that　both　India　and　England　will　pay　a　severe　penalty　for　the　shortsighted　policy　by　which　this　intermediate　instrument　of　government　was　done　away　with。　　　It　is　of　no　avail　to　say　that　such　a　delegated　body　cannot　have　all　the　requisites　of　good　government；　above　all；　cannot　have　that　complete　and　ever…operative　identity　of　interest　with　the　governed　which　it　is　so　difficult　to　obtain　even　where　the　people　to　be　ruled　are　in　some　degree　qualified　to　look　after　their　own　affairs。　Real　good　government　is　not　compatible　with　the　conditions　of　the　case。　There　is　but　a　choice　of　imperfections。　The　problem　is；　so　to　construct　the　governing　body　that；　under　the　difficulties　of　the　position；　it　shall　have　as　much　interest　as　possible　in　good　government；　and　as　little　in　bad。　Now　these　conditions　are　best　found　in　an　intermediate　body。　A　delegated　administration　has　always　this　advantage　over　a　direct　one；　that　it　has；　at　all　events；　no　duty　to　perform　except　to　the　governed。　It　has　no　interests　to　consider　except　theirs。　Its　own　power　of　deriving　profit　from　misgovernment　may　be　reduced…　in　the　latest　constitution　of　the　East　India　Company　it　was　reduced…　to　a　singularly　small　amount：　and　it　can　be　kept　entirely　clear　of　bias　from　the　individual　or　class　interests　of　any　one　else。　　　When　the　home　government　and　Parliament　are　swayed　by　those　partial　influences　in　the　exercise　of　the　power　reserved　to　them　in　the　last　resort；　the　intermediate　body　is　the　certain　advocate　and　champion　of　the　dependency　before　the　imperial　tribunal。　The　intermediate　body；　moreover；　is；　in　the　natural　course　of　things；　chiefly　composed　of　persons　who　have　acquired　professional　knowledge　of　this　part　of　their　country's　concerns；　who　have　been　trained　to　it　in　the　place　itself；　and　have　made　its　administration　the　main　occupation　of　their　lives。　Furnished　with　these　qualifications；　and　not　being　liable　to　lose　their　office　from　the　accidents　of　home　politics；　they　identify　their　character　and　consideration　with　their　special　trust；　and　have　a　much　more　permanent　interest　in　the　success　of　their　administration；　and　in　the　prosperity　of　the　country　which　they　administer；　than　a　member　of　a　Cabinet　under　a　representative　constitution　can　possibly　have　in　the　good　government　of　any　country　except　the　one　which　he　serves。　So　far　as　the　choice　of　those　who　carry　on　the　management　on　the　spot　devolves　upon　this　body；　the　appointments　are　kept　out　of　the　vortex　of　party　and　parliamentary　jobbing；　and　freed　from　the　influence　of　those　motives　to　the　abuse　of　patronage；　for　the　reward　of　adherents；　or　to　buy　off　those　who　would　otherwise　be　opponents；　which　are　always　stronger；　with　statesmen　of　average　honesty；　than　a　conscientious　sense　of　the　duty　of　appointing　the　fittest　man。　To　put　this　one　class　of　appointments　as　far　as　possible　out　of　harm's　way　is　of　more　consequence　than　the　worst　which　can　happen　to　all　other　offices　in　the　state；　for；　in　every　other　department；　if　the　officer　is　unqualified；　the　general　opinion　of　the　community　directs　him　in　a　certain　degree　what　to　do：　but　in　the　position　of　the　administrators　of　a　dependency　where　the　people　are　not　fit　to　have　the　control　in　their　own　hands；　the　character　of　the　government　entirely　depends　on　the　qualifications；　moral　and　intellectual；　of　the　individual　functionaries。　　　It　cannot　be　too　often　repeated；　that　in　a　country　like　India　everything　depends　on　the　personal　qualities　and　capacities　of　the　agents　of　government。　This　truth　is　the　cardinal　principle　of　Indian　administration。　The　day　when　it　comes　to　be　thought　that　the　appointment　of　persons　to　situations　of　trust　from　motives　of　convenience；　already　so　criminal　in　England；　can　be　practised　with　impunity　in　India；　will　be　the　beginning　of　the　decline　and　fall　of　our　empire　there。　Even　with　a　sincere　intention　of　preferring　the　best　candidate；　it　will　not　do　to　rely　on　chance　for　supplying　fit　persons。　The　system　must　be　calculated　to　form　them。　It　has　done　this　hitherto；　and　because　it　has　done　so；　our　rule　in　India　has　lasted；　and　been　one　of　constant；　if　not　very　rapid；　improvement　in　prosperity　and　good　administration。　As　much　bitterness　is　now　manifested　against　this　system；　and　as　much　eagerness　displayed　to　overthrow　it；　as　if　educating　and　training　the　officers　of　government　for　their　work　were　a　thing　utterly　unreasonable　and　indefensible；　an　unjustifiable　interference　with　the　rights　of　ignorance　and　inexperience。　There　is　a　tacit　conspiracy　between　those　who　would　like　to　job　in　first…rate　Indian　offices　for　their　connections　here；　and　those　who；　being　already　in　India；　claim　to　be　promoted　from　the　indigo　factory　or　the　attorney's　office；　to　administer　justice　or　fix　the　payments　due　to　government　from　millions　of　people。　The　〃monopoly〃　of　the　Civil　Service；　so　much　inveighed　against；　is　like　the　monopoly　of　judicial　offices　by　the　bar；　and　its　abolition　would　be　like　opening　the　bench　in　Westminster　Hall　to　the　first　comer　whose　friends　certify　that　he　has　now　and　then　looked　into　Blackstone。　Were　the　course　ever　adopted　of　sending　men　from　this　country；　or　encouraging　them　in　going　out；　to　get　themselves　put　into　high　appointments　without　having　learnt　their　business　by　passing　through　the　lower　ones；　the　most　important　offices　would　be　thrown　to　Scotch　cousins　and　adventurers；　connected　by　no　professional　feeling　with　the　country　or　the　work；　held　to　no　previous　knowledge；　and　eager　only　to　make　money　rapidly　and　return　home。　　　The　safety　of　the　country　is；