representative government-第74章

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l　questions　which　arise　between　the　country　and　foreign　governments；　but　to　making　any　other　arrangements　which　are；　in　the　opinion　of　the　States；　necessary　to　their　enjoyment　of　the　full　benefits　of　union。　For　example；　it　is　a　great　advantage　to　them　that　their　mutual　commerce　should　be　free；　without　the　impediment　of　frontier　duties　and　custom…houses。　But　this　internal　freedom　cannot　exist　if　each　State　has　the　power　of　fixing　the　duties　on　interchange　of　commodities　between　itself　and　foreign　countries；　since　every　foreign　product　let　in　by　one　State　would　be　let　into　all　the　rest。　And　hence　all　custom　duties　and　trade　regulations；　in　the　United　States；　are　made　or　repealed　by　the　Federal　Government　exclusively。　Again；　it　is　a　great　convenience　to　the　States　to　have　but　one　coinage；　and　but　one　system　of　weights　and　measures；　which　can　only　be　ensured　if　the　regulation　of　these　matters　is　entrusted　to　the　Federal　Government。　The　certainty　and　celerity　of　Post　Office　communication　is　impeded；　and　its　expense　increased；　if　a　letter　has　to　pass　through　half　a　dozen　sets　of　public　offices；　subject　to　different　supreme　authorities：　it　is　convenient；　therefore；　that　all　Post　Offices　should　be　under　the　Federal　Government。　But　on　such　questions　the　feelings　of　different　communities　are　liable　to　be　different。　One　of　the　American　States；　under　the　guidance　of　a　man　who　has　displayed　powers　as　a　speculative　political　thinker　superior　to　any　who　has　appeared　in　American　politics　since　the　authors　of　the　Federalist；*　claimed　a　veto　for　each　State　on　the　custom　laws　of　the　Federal　Congress：　and　that　statesman；　in　a　posthumous　work　of　great　ability；　which　has　been　printed　and　widely　circulated　by　the　legislature　of　South　Carolina；　vindicated　this　pretension　on　the　general　principle　of　limiting　the　tyranny　of　the　majority；　and　protecting　minorities　by　admitting　them　to　a　substantial　participation　in　political　power。　One　of　the　most　disputed　topics　in　American　politics；　during　the　early　part　of　this　century；　was　whether　the　power　of　the　Federal　Government　ought　to　extend；　and　whether　by　the　Constitution　it　did　extend；　to　making　roads　and　canals　at　the　cost　of　the　Union。　It　is　only　in　transactions　with　foreign　powers　that　the　authority　of　the　Federal　Government　is　of　necessity　complete。　On　every　other　subject；　the　question　depends　on　how　closely　the　people　in　general　wish　to　draw　the　federal　tie；　what　portion　of　their　local　freedom　of　action　they　are　willing　to　surrender；　in　order　to　enjoy　more　fully　the　benefit　of　being　one　nation。

　　*　Mr。　Calhoun。

　　Respecting　the　fitting　constitution　of　a　federal　government　within　itself　much　need　not　be　said。　It　of　course　consists　of　a　legislative　branch　and　an　executive；　and　the　constitution　of　each　is　amenable　to　the　same　principles　as　that　of　representative　governments　generally。　As　regards　the　mode　of　adapting　these　general　principles　to　a　federal　government；　the　provision　of　the　American　Constitution　seems　exceedingly　judicious；　that　Congress　should　consist　of　two　Houses；　and　that　while　one　of　them　is　constituted　according　to　population；　each　State　being　entitled　to　representatives　in　the　ratio　of　the　number　of　its　inhabitants；　the　other　should　represent　not　the　citizens；　but　the　State　Governments；　and　every　State；　whether　large　or　small；　should　be　represented　in　it　by　the　same　number　of　members。　This　provision　precludes　any　undue　power　from　being　exercised　by　the　more　powerful　States　over　the　rest；　and　guarantees　the　reserved　rights　of　the　State　Governments；　by　making　it　impossible；　as　far　as　the　mode　of　representation　can　prevent；　that　any　measure　should　pass　Congress　unless　approved　not　only　by　a　majority　of　the　citizens；　but　by　a　majority　of　the　States。　I　have　before　adverted　to　the　further　incidental　advantage　obtained　of　raising　the　standard　of　qualifications　in　one　of　the　Houses。　Being　nominated　by　select　bodies；　the　Legislatures　of　the　various　States；　whose　choice；　for　reasons　already　indicated；　is　more　likely　to　fall　on　eminent　men　than　any　popular　election…　who　have　not　only　the　power　of　electing　such；　but　a　strong　motive　to　do　so；　because　the　influence　of　their　State　in　the　general　deliberations　must　be　materially　affected　by　the　personal　weight　and　abilities　of　its　representatives；　the　Senate　of　the　United　States；　thus　chosen；　has　always　contained　nearly　all　the　political　men　of　established　and　high　reputation　in　the　Union：　while　the　Lower　House　of　Congress　has；　in　the　opinion　of　competent　observers；　been　generally　as　remarkable　for　the　absence　of　conspicuous　personal　merit　as　the　Upper　House　for　its　presence。　　　When　the　conditions　exist　for　the　formation　of　efficient　and　durable　Federal　Unions；　the　multiplication　of　them　is　always　a　benefit　to　the　world。　It　has　the　same　salutary　effect　as　any　other　extension　of　the　practice　of　co…operation；　through　which　the　weak；　by　uniting；　can　meet　on　equal　terms　with　the　strong。　By　diminishing　the　number　of　those　petty　states　which　are　not　equal　to　their　own　defence；　it　weakens　the　temptations　to　an　aggressive　policy；　whether　working　directly　by　arms；　or　through　the　prestige　of　superior　power。　It　of　course　puts　an　end　to　war　and　diplomatic　quarrels；　and　usually　also　to　restrictions　on　commerce；　between　the　States　composing　the　Union；　while；　in　reference　to　neighbouring　nations；　the　increased　military　strength　conferred　by　it　is　of　a　kind　to　be　almost　exclusively　available　for　defensive；　scarcely　at　all　for　aggressive；　purposes。　A　federal　government　has　not　a　sufficiently　concentrated　authority　to　conduct　with　much　efficiency　any　war　but　one　of　self…defence；　in　which　it　can　rely　on　the　voluntary　co…operation　of　every　citizen：　nor　is　there　anything　very　flattering　to　national　vanity　or　ambition　in　acquiring；　by　a　successful　war；　not　subjects；　nor　even　fellow…citizens；　but　only　new；　and　perhaps　troublesome；　independent　members　of　the　confederation。　The　warlike　proceedings　of　the　Americans　in　Mexico　were　purely　exceptional；　having　been　carried　on　principally　by　volunteers；　under　the　influence　of　the　migratory　propensity　which　prompts　individual　Americans　to　possess　themselves　of　unoccupied　land；　and　stimulated；　if　by　any　public　motive；　not　by　that　of　national　aggrandisement；　but　by　the　purely　sectional　purpose　of　extending　slavery。　There　are　few　signs　in　the　proceedings　of　Americans；　nationally　or　individually；　that　the　desire　of　territorial　acquisition　for　their　country　as　such　has　any　considerable　power　over　them。　Their　hankering　after　Cuba　is；　in　the　same　manner；　merely　sectional；　and　the　northern　States；　those　opposed　to　slavery；　have　never　in　any　way　favoured　it。　　　The　question　may　present　itself　（as　in　Italy　at　its　present　uprising）　whether　a　country；　which　is　determined　to　be　united；　should　form　a　complete　or　a　merely　federal　union。　The　point　is　sometimes　necessarily　decided　by　the　mere　territorial　magnitude　of　the　united　whole。　There　is　a　limit　to　the　extent　of　country　which　can　advantageously　be　governed；　or　even　whose　government　can　be　conveniently　superintended；　from　a　single　centre。　There　are　vast　countries　so　governed；　but　they；　or　at　least　their　distant　provinces；　are　in　general　deplorably　ill　administered；　and　it　is　only　when　the　inha