representative government-第72章

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in　which　the　provinces；　after　separation；　might　usefully　remain　united　by　a　federal　tie：　but　it　generally　happens　that　if　they　are　willing　to　forego　complete　independence；　and　become　members　of　a　federation；　each　of　them　has　other　neighbours　with　whom　it　would　prefer　to　connect　itself；　having　more　sympathies　in　common；　if　not　also　greater　community　of　interest。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　17　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Federal　Representative　Governments。

　　PORTIONS　OF　mankind　who　are　not　fitted；　or　not　disposed；　to　live　under　the　same　internal　government；　may　often　with　advantage　be　federally　united　as　to　their　relations　with　foreigners：　both　to　prevent　wars　among　themselves；　and　for　the　sake　of　more　effectual　protection　against　the　aggression　of　powerful　States。　　　To　render　a　federation　advisable；　several　conditions　are　necessary。　The　first　is；　that　there　should　be　a　sufficient　amount　of　mutual　sympathy　among　the　populations。　The　federation　binds　them　always　to　fight　on　the　same　side；　and　if　they　have　such　feelings　towards　one　another；　or　such　diversity　of　feeling　towards　their　neighbours；　that　they　would　generally　prefer　to　fight　on　opposite　sides；　the　federal　tie　is　neither　likely　to　be　of　long　duration；　not　to　be　well　observed　while　it　subsists。　The　sympathies　available　for　the　purpose　are　those　of　race；　language；　religion；　and；　above　all；　of　political　institutions；　as　conducing　most　to　a　feeling　of　identity　of　political　interest。　When　a　few　free　states；　separately　insufficient　for　their　own　defence；　are　hemmed　in　on　all　sides　by　military　or　feudal　monarchs；　who　hate　and　despise　freedom　even　in　a　neighbour；　those　states　have　no　chance　for　preserving　liberty　and　its　blessings　but　by　a　federal　union。　The　common　interest　arising　from　this　cause　has　in　Switzerland；　for　several　centuries；　been　found　adequate　to　maintain　efficiently　the　federal　bond；　in　spite　not　only　of　difference　of　religion　when　religion　was　the　grand　source　of　irreconcilable　political　enmity　throughout　Europe；　but　also　in　spite　of　great　weakness　in　the　constitution　of　the　federation　itself。　In　America；　where　all　the　conditions　for　the　maintenance　of　union　existed　at　the　highest　point；　with　the　sole　drawback　of　difference　of　institutions　in　the　single　but　most　important　article　of　Slavery；　this　one　difference　has　gone　so　far　in　alienating　from　each　other's　sympathies　the　two　divisions　of　the　Union；　that　the　maintenance　or　disruption　of　a　tie　of　so　much　value　to　them　both　depends　on　the　issue　of　an　obstinate　civil　war。　　　A　second　condition　of　the　stability　of　a　federal　government　is　that　the　separate　states　be　not　so　powerful　as　to　be　able　to　rely；　for　protection　against　foreign　encroachment；　on　their　individual　strength。　If　they　are；　they　will　be　apt　to　think　that　they　do　not　gain；　by　union　with　others；　the　equivalent　of　what　they　sacrifice　in　their　own　liberty　of　action；　and　consequently；　whenever　the　policy　of　the　Confederation；　in　things　reserved　to　its　cognisance；　is　different　from　that　which　any　one　of　its　members　would　separately　pursue；　the　internal　and　sectional　breach　will；　through　absence　of　sufficient　anxiety　to　preserve　the　union；　be　in　danger　of　going　so　far　as　to　dissolve　it。　　　A　third　condition；　not　less　important　than　the　two　others；　is　that　there　be　not　a　very　marked　inequality　of　strength　among　the　several　contracting　states。　They　cannot；　indeed；　be　exactly　equal　in　resources：　in　all　federations　there　will　be　a　gradation　of　power　among　the　members；　some　will　be　more　populous；　rich；　and　civilised　than　others。　There　is　a　wide　difference　in　wealth　and　population　between　New　York　and　Rhode　Island；　between　Bern　and　Zug　or　Glaris。　The　essential　is；　that　there　should　not　be　any　one　State　so　much　more　powerful　than　the　rest　as　to　be　capable　of　vying　in　strength　with　many　of　them　combined。　If　there　be　such　a　one；　and　only　one；　it　will　insist　on　being　master　of　the　joint　deliberations：　if　there　be　two；　they　will　be　irresistible　when　they　agree；　and　whenever　they　differ　everything　will　be　decided　by　a　struggle　for　ascendancy　between　the　rivals。　This　cause　is　alone　enough　to　reduce　the　German　Bund　to　almost　a　nullity；　independently　of　its　wretched　internal　constitution。　It　effects　none　of　the　real　purposes　of　a　confederation。　It　has　never　bestowed　on　Germany　a　uniform　system　of　customs；　nor　so　much　as　a　uniform　coinage；　and　has　served　only　to　give　Austria　and　Prussia　a　legal　right　of　pouring　in　their　troops　to　assist　the　local　sovereigns　in　keeping　their　subjects　obedient　to　despotism：　while　in　regard　to　external　concerns；　the　Bund　would　make　all　Germany　a　dependency　of　Prussia　if　there　were　no　Austria；　and　of　Austria　if　there　were　no　Prussia：　and　in　the　meantime　each　petty　prince　has　little　choice　but　to　be　a　partisan　of　one　or　the　other；　or　to　intrigue　with　foreign　governments　against　both。　　　There　are　two　different　modes　of　organising　a　Federal　Union。　The　federal　authorities　may　represent　the　Governments　solely；　and　their　acts　may　be　obligatory　only　on　the　Governments　as　such；　or　they　may　have　the　power　of　enacting　laws　and　issuing　orders　which　are　binding　directly　on　individual　citizens。　The　former　is　the　plan　of　the　German　so…called　Confederation；　and　of　the　Swiss　Constitution　previous　to　1847。　It　was　tried　in　America　for　a　few　years　immediately　following　the　War　of　Independence。　The　other　principle　is　that　of　the　existing　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　and　has　been　adopted　within　the　last　dozen　years　by　the　Swiss　Confederacy。　The　Federal　Congress　of　the　American　Union　is　a　substantive　part　of　the　government　of　every　individual　State。　Within　the　limits　of　its　attributions；　it　makes　laws　which　are　obeyed　by　every　citizen　individually；　executes　them　through　its　own　officers；　and　enforces　them　by　its　own　tribunals。　This　is　the　only　principle　which　has　been　found；　or　which　is　ever　likely；　to　produce　an　effective　federal　government。　A　union　between　the　governments　only　is　a　mere　alliance；　and　subject　to　all　the　contingencies　which　render　alliances　precarious。　If　the　acts　of　the　President　and　of　Congress　were　binding　solely　on　the　Governments　of　New　York；　Virginia；　or　Pennsylvania；　and　could　only　be　carried　into　effect　through　orders　issued　by　those　Governments　to　officers　appointed　by　them；　under　responsibility　to　their　own　courts　of　justice　no　mandates　of　the　Federal　Government　which　were　disagreeable　to　a　local　majority　would　ever　be　executed。　Requisitions　issued　to　a　government　have　no　other　sanction；　or　means　of　enforcement；　than　war：　and　a　federal　army　would　have　to　be　always　in　readiness　to　enforce　the　decrees　of　the　Federation　against　any　recalcitrant　State；　subject　to　the　probability　that　other　States；　sympathising　with　the　recusant；　and　perhaps　sharing　its　sentiments　on　the　particular　point　in　dispute；　would　withhold　their　contingents；　if　not　send　them　to　fight　in　the　ranks　of　the　disobedient　State。　　　Such　a　federation　is　more　likely　to　be　a　cause　than　a　preventive　of　internal　wars：　and　if　such　was　not　its　effect　in　Switzerland　until　the　events　of　the　years　immediately　preceding　1847；　it　was　only　because　the　Federal　Government　felt　its　weakness　so　strongly　that　it　hardly　ever　attempted　to　exercise　any　real　authority。　In　America；　the　experiment　of