representative government-第60章

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wo　departments；　of　able　and　experienced　professional　men。　As　a　means　of　obtaining　the　best　men　for　the　purpose　under　every　change　of　administration；　they　ought　to　be　permanent：　by　which　I　mean；　that　they　ought　not；　like　the　Lords　of　the　Admiralty；　to　be　expected　to　resign　with　the　ministry　by　whom　they　were　appointed：　but　it　is　a　good　rule　that　all　who　hold　high　appointments　to　which　they　have　risen　by　selection；　and　not　by　the　ordinary　course　of　promotion；　should　retain　their　office　only　for　a　fixed　term；　unless　reappointed；　as　is　now　the　rule　with　Staff　appointments　in　the　British　army。　This　rule　renders　appointments　somewhat　less　likely　to　be　jobbed；　not　being　a　provision　for　life；　and　the　same　time　affords　a　means；　without　affront　to　any　one；　of　getting　rid　of　those　who　are　least　worth　keeping；　and　bringing　in　highly　qualified　persons　of　younger　standing；　for　whom　there　might　never　be　room　if　death　vacancies；　or　voluntary　resignations；　were　waited　for。　　　The　Councils　should　be　consultative　merely；　in　this　sense；　that　the　ultimate　decision　should　rest　undividedly　with　the　minister　himself：　but　neither　ought　they　to　be　looked　upon；　or　to　look　upon　themselves；　as　ciphers；　or　as　capable　of　being　reduced　to　such　at　his　pleasure。　The　advisers　attached　to　a　powerful　and　perhaps　self…willed　man　ought　to　be　placed　under　conditions　which　make　it　impossible　for　them；　without　discredit；　not　to　express　an　opinion；　and　impossible　for　him　not　to　listen　to　and　consider　their　recommendations；　whether　he　adopts　them　or　not。　The　relation　which　ought　to　exist　between　a　chief　and　this　description　of　advisers　is　very　accurately　hit　by　the　constitution　of　the　Council　of　the　Governor…General　and　those　of　the　different　Presidencies　in　India。　These　Councils　are　composed　of　persons　who　have　professional　knowledge　of　Indian　affairs；　which　the　Governor…General　and　Governors　usually　lack；　and　which　it　would　not　be　desirable　to　require　of　them。　As　a　rule；　every　member　of　Council　is　expected　to　give　an　opinion；　which　is　of　course　very　often　a　simple　acquiescence：　but　if　there　is　a　difference　of　sentiment；　it　is　at　the　option　of　every　member；　and　is　the　invariable　practice；　to　record　the　reasons　of　his　opinion：　the　Governor…General；　or　Governor；　doing　the　same。　In　ordinary　cases　the　decision　is　according　to　the　sense　of　the　majority；　the　Council；　therefore；　has　a　substantial　part　in　the　government：　but　if　the　Governor…General；　or　Governor；　thinks　fit；　he　may　set　aside　even　their　unanimous　opinion；　recording　his　reasons。　The　result　is；　that　the　chief　is　individually　and　effectively　responsible　for　every　act　of　the　Government。　The　members　of　Council　have　only　the　responsibility　of　advisers；　but　it　is　always　known；　from　documents　capable　of　being　produced；　and　which　if　called　for　by　Parliament　or　public　opinion　always　are　produced；　what　each　has　advised；　and　what　reasons　he　gave　for　his　advice：　while；　from　their　dignified　position；　and　ostensible　participation　in　all　acts　of　government；　they　have　nearly　as　strong　motives　to　apply　themselves　to　the　public　business；　and　to　form　and　express　a　well…considered　opinion　on　every　part　of　it；　as　if　the　whole　responsibility　rested　with　themselves。　　　This　mode　of　conducting　the　highest　class　of　administrative　business　is　one　of　the　most　successful　instances　of　the　adaptation　of　means　to　ends　which　political　history；　not　hitherto　very　prolific　in　works　of　skill　and　contrivance；　has　yet　to　show。　It　is　one　of　the　acquisitions　with　which　the　art　of　politics　has　been　enriched　by　the　experience　of　the　East　India　Company's　rule；　and；　like　most　of　the　other　wise　contrivances　by　which　India　has　been　preserved　to　this　country；　and　an　amount　of　good　government　produced　which　is　truly　wonderful　considering　the　circumstances　and　the　materials；　it　is　probably　destined　to　perish　in　the　general　holocaust　which　the　traditions　of　Indian　government　seem　fated　to　undergo；　since　they　have　been　placed　at　the　mercy　of　public　ignorance；　and　the　presumptuous　vanity　of　political　men。　Already　an　outcry　is　raised　for　abolishing　the　Councils；　as　a　superfluous　and　expensive　clog　on　the　wheels　of　government：　while　the　clamour　has　long　been　urgent；　and　is　daily　obtaining　more　countenance　in　the　highest　quarters；　for　the　abrogation　of　the　professional　civil　service　which　breeds　the　men　that　compose　the　Councils；　and　the　existence　of　which　is　the　sole　guarantee　for　their　being　of　any　value。

　　A　most　important　principle　of　good　government　in　a　popular　constitution　is　that　no　executive　functionaries　should　be　appointed　by　popular　election：　neither　by　the　votes　of　the　people　themselves；　nor　by　those　of　their　representatives。　The　entire　business　of　government　is　skilled　employment；　the　qualifications　for　the　discharge　of　it　are　of　that　special　and　professional　kind　which　cannot　be　properly　judged　of　except　by　persons　who　have　themselves　some　share　of　those　qualifications；　or　some　practical　experience　of　them。　The　business　of　finding　the　fittest　persons　to　fill　public　employments…　not　merely　selecting　the　best　who　offer；　but　looking　out　for　the　absolutely　best；　and　taking　note　of　all　fit　persons　who　are　met　with；　that　they　may　be　found　when　wanted…　is　very　laborious；　and　requires　a　delicate　as　well　as　highly　conscientious　discernment；　and　as　there　is　no　public　duty　which　is　in　general　so　badly　performed；　so　there　is　none　for　which　it　is　of　greater　importance　to　enforce　the　utmost　practicable　amount　of　personal　responsibility；　by　imposing　it　as　a　special　obligation　on　high　functionaries　in　the　several　departments。　All　subordinate　public　officers　who　are　not　appointed　by　some　mode　of　public　competition　should　be　selected　on　the　direct　responsibility　of　the　minister　under　whom　they　serve。　The　ministers；　all　but　the　chief；　will　naturally　be　selected　by　the　chief；　and　the　chief　himself；　though　really　designated　by　Parliament；　should　be；　in　a　regal　government；　officially　appointed　by　the　Crown。　The　functionary　who　appoints　should　be　the　sole　person　empowered　to　remove　any　subordinate　officer　who　is　liable　to　removal；　which　the　far　greater　number　ought　not　to　be；　except　for　personal　misconduct；　since　it　would　be　vain　to　expect　that　the　body　of　persons　by　whom　the　whole　detail　of　the　public　business　is　transacted；　and　whose　qualifications　are　generally　of　much　more　importance　to　the　public　than　those　of　the　minister　himself；　will　devote　themselves　to　their　profession；　and　acquire　the　knowledge　and　skill　on　which　the　minister　must　often　place　entire　dependence；　if　they　are　liable　at　any　moment　to　be　turned　adrift　for　no　fault；　that　the　minister　may　gratify　himself；　or　promote　his　political　interest；　by　appointing　somebody　else。　　　To　the　principle　which　condemns　the　appointment　of　executive　officers　by　popular　suffrage；　ought　the　chief　of　the　executive；　in　a　republican　government；　to　be　an　exception？　Is　it　a　good　rule；　which；　in　the　American　Constitution；　provides　for　the　election　of　the　President　once　in　every　four　years　by　the　entire　people？　The　question　is　not　free　from　difficulty。　There　is　unquestionably　some　advantage；　in　a　country　like　America；　where　no　apprehension　needs　be　entertained　of　a　coup　d'etat；　in　making　the　chief　minister　constitutionally　independent