representative government-第56章

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s　an　overwhelming　national　feeling　on　the　contrary　side；　and　might　yet　very　properly　lead　to　their　rejection　by　the　electors　at　the　time　of　the　Chinese　quarrel　（though　in　itself　a　more　doubtful　question）；　because　it　was　then　for　some　time　a　moot　point　whether　their　view　of　the　case　might　not　prevail。　　　As　the　general　result　of　what　precedes；　we　may　affirm　that　actual　pledges　should　not　be　required；　unless；　from　unfavourable　social　circumstances　or　faulty　institutions；　the　electors　are　so　narrowed　in　their　choice　as　to　be　compelled　to　fix　it　on　a　person　presumptively　under　the　influence　of　partialities　hostile　to　their　interest：　That　they　are　entitled　to　a　full　knowledge　of　the　political　opinions　and　sentiments　of　the　candidate；　and　not　only　entitled；　but　often　bound；　to　reject　one　who　differs　from　themselves　on　the　few　articles　which　are　the　foundation　of　their　political　belief：　That　in　proportion　to　the　opinion　they　entertain　of　the　mental　superiority　of　a　candidate；　they　ought　to　put　up　with　his　expressing　and　acting　on　opinions　different　from　theirs　on　any　number　of　things　not　included　in　their　fundamental　articles　of　belief：　That　they　ought　to　be　unremitting　in　their　search　for　a　representative　of　such　calibre　as　to　be　entrusted　with　full　power　of　obeying　the　dictates　of　his　own　judgment：　That　they　should　consider　it　a　duty　which　they　owe　to　their　fellow…countrymen；　to　do　their　utmost　towards　placing　men　of　this　quality　in　the　legislature：　and　that　it　is　of　much　greater　importance　to　themselves　to　be　represented　by　such　a　man　than　by　one　who　professes　agreement　in　a　greater　number　of　their　opinions：　for　the　benefits　of　his　ability　are　certain；　while　the　hypothesis　of　his　being　wrong　and　their　being　right　on　the　points　of　difference　is　a　very　doubtful　one。　　　I　have　discussed　this　question　on　the　assumption　that　the　electoral　system；　in　all　that　depends　on　positive　institution；　conforms　to　the　principles　laid　down　in　the　preceding　chapters。　Even　on　this　hypothesis；　the　delegation　theory　of　representation　seems　to　me　false；　and　its　practical　operation　hurtful；　though　the　mischief　would　in　that　case　be　confined　within　certain　bounds。　But　if　the　securities　by　which　I　have　endeavoured　to　guard　the　representative　principle　are　not　recognised　by　the　Constitution；　if　provision　is　not　made　for　the　representation　of　minorities；　nor　any　difference　admitted　in　the　numerical　value　of　votes；　according　to　some　criterion　of　the　amount　of　education　possessed　by　the　voters；　in　that　case　no　words　can　exaggerate　the　importance　in　principle　of　leaving　an　unfettered　discretion　to　the　representative；　for　it　would　then　be　the　only　chance；　under　universal　suffrage；　for　any　other　opinions　than　those　of　the　majority　to　be　heard　in　Parliament。　In　that　falsely　called　democracy　which　is　really　the　exclusive　rule　of　the　operative　classes；　all　others　being　unrepresented　and　unheard；　the　only　escape　from　class　legislation　in　its　narrowest；　and　political　ignorance　in　its　most　dangerous；　form；　would　lie　in　such　disposition　as　the　uneducated　might　have　to　choose　educated　representatives；　and　to　defer　to　their　opinions。　Some　willingness　to　do　this　might　reasonably　be　expected；　and　everything　would　depend　upon　cultivating　it　to　the　highest　point。　But；　once　invested　with　political　omnipotence；　if　the　operative　classes　voluntarily　concurred　in　imposing　in　this　or　any　other　manner　any　considerable　limitation　upon　their　self…opinion　and　self…will；　they　would　prove　themselves　wiser　than　any　class；　possessed　of　absolute　power；　has　shown　itself；　or；　we　may　venture　to　say；　is　ever　likely　to　show　itself；　under　that　corrupting　influence。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　13　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　a　Second　Chamber。

　　OF　ALL　topics　relating　to　the　theory　of　representative　government；　none　has　been　the　subject　of　more　discussion；　especially　on　the　Continent；　than　what　is　known　as　the　question　of　the　Two　Chambers。　It　has　occupied　a　greater　amount　of　the　attention　of　thinkers　than　many　questions　of　ten　times　its　importance；　and　has　been　regarded　as　a　sort　of　touchstone　which　distinguishes　the　partisans　of　limited　from　those　of　uncontrolled　democracy。　For　my　own　part；　I　set　little　value　on　any　check　which　a　Second　Chamber　can　apply　to　a　democracy　otherwise　unchecked；　and　I　am　inclined　to　think　that　if　all　other　constitutional　questions　are　rightly　decided；　it　is　but　of　secondary　importance　whether　the　Parliament　consists　of　two　Chambers；　or　only　of　one。　　　If　there　are　two　Chambers；　they　may　either　be　of　similar；　or　of　dissimilar　composition。　If　of　similar；　both　will　obey　the　same　influences；　and　whatever　has　a　majority　in　one　of　the　Houses　will　be　likely　to　have　it　in　the　other。　It　is　true　that　the　necessity　of　obtaining　the　consent　of　both　to　the　passing　of　any　measure　may　at　times　be　a　material　obstacle　to　improvement；　since；　assuming　both　the　Houses　to　be　representative；　and　equal　in　their　numbers；　a　number　slightly　exceeding　a　fourth　of　the　entire　representation　may　prevent　the　passing　of　a　Bill；　while；　if　there　is　but　one　House；　a　Bill　is　secure　of　passing　if　it　has　a　bare　majority。　But　the　case　supposed　is　rather　abstractedly　possible　than　likely　to　occur　in　practice。　It　will　not　often　happen　that　of　two　Houses　similarly　composed；　one　will　be　almost　unanimous；　and　the　other　nearly　equally　divided：　if　a　majority　in　one　rejects　a　measure；　there　will　generally　have　been　a　large　minority　unfavourable　to　it　in　the　other；　any　improvement；　therefore；　which　could　be　thus　impeded；　would　in　almost　all　cases　be　one　which　had　not　much　more　than　a　simple　majority　in　the　entire　body；　and　the　worst　consequence　that　could　ensue　would　be　to　delay　for　a　short　time　the　passing　of　the　measure；　or　give　rise　to　a　fresh　appeal　to　the　electors　to　ascertain　if　the　small　majority　in　Parliament　corresponded　to　an　effective　one　in　the　country。　The　inconvenience　of　delay；　and　the　advantages　of　the　appeal　to　the　nation；　might　be　regarded　in　this　case　as　about　equally　balanced。　　　I　attach　little　weight　to　the　argument　oftenest　urged　for　having　two　Chambers…　to　prevent　precipitancy；　and　compel　a　second　deliberation；　for　it　must　be　a　very　ill…constituted　representative　assembly　in　which　the　established　forms　of　business　do　not　require　many　more　than　two　deliberations。　The　consideration　which　tells　most；　in　my　judgment；　in　favour　of　two　Chambers　（and　this　I　do　regard　as　of　some　moment）　is　the　evil　effect　produced　upon　the　mind　of　any　holder　of　power；　whether　an　individual　or　an　assembly；　by　the　consciousness　of　having　only　themselves　to　consult。　It　is　important　that　no　set　of　persons　should；　in　great　affairs；　be　able；　even　temporarily；　to　make　their　sic　volo　prevail　without　asking　any　one　else　for　his　consent。　A　majority　in　a　single　assembly；　when　it　has　assumed　a　permanent　character…　when　composed　of　the　same　persons　habitually　acting　together；　and　always　assured　of　victory　in　their　own　House…　easily　becomes　despotic　and　overweening；　if　released　from　the　necessity　of　considering　whether　its　acts　will　be　concurred　in　by　another　constituted　authority。　The　same　reason　which　induced　the　Romans　to　have　two　consuls　makes　it　desirable　there　should　be　two　Chambers：　that　neither　of　them　may　be　exposed　to　the