representative government-第5章

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them　by　their　government；　and　none　of　the　good　which　social　existence　is　capable　of　can　be　any　further　realised　than　as　the　constitution　of　the　government　is　compatible　with；　and　allows　scope　for；　its　attainment。　Not　to　speak　of　indirect　effects；　the　direct　meddling　of　the　public　authorities　has　no　necessary　limits　but　those　of　human　existence；　and　the　influence　of　government　on　the　well…being　of　society　can　be　considered　or　estimated　in　reference　to　nothing　less　than　the　whole　of　the　interests　of　humanity。　　　Being　thus　obliged　to　place　before　ourselves；　as　the　test　of　good　and　bad　government；　so　complex　an　object　as　the　aggregate　interests　of　society；　we　would　willingly　attempt　some　kind　of　classification　of　those　interests；　which；　bringing　them　before　the　mind　in　definite　groups；　might　give　indication　of　the　qualities　by　which　a　form　of　government　is　fitted　to　promote　those　various　interests　respectively。　It　would　be　a　great　facility　if　we　could　say　the　good　of　society　consists　of　such　and　such　elements；　one　of　these　elements　requires　such　conditions；　another　such　others；　the　government；　then；　which　unites　in　the　greatest　degree　all　these　conditions；　must　be　the　best。　The　theory　of　government　would　thus　be　built　up　from　the　separate　theorems　of　the　elements　which　compose　a　good　state　of　society。　　　Unfortunately；　to　enumerate　and　classify　the　constituents　of　social　well…being；　so　as　to　admit　of　the　formation　of　such　theorems；　is　no　easy　task。　Most　of　those　who；　in　the　last　or　present　generation；　have　applied　themselves　to　the　philosophy　of　politics　in　any　comprehensive　spirit；　have　felt　the　importance　of　such　a　classification；　but　the　attempts　which　have　been　made　towards　it　are　as　yet　limited；　so　far　as　I　am　aware；　to　a　single　step。　The　classification　begins　and　ends　with　a　partition　of　the　exigencies　of　society　between　the　two　heads　of　Order　and　Progress　（in　the　phraseology　of　French　thinkers）；　Permanence　and　Progression　in　the　words　of　Coleridge。　This　division　is　plausible　and　seductive；　from　the　apparently　clean…cut　opposition　between　its　two　members；　and　the　remarkable　difference　between　the　sentiments　to　which　they　appeal。　But　I　apprehend　that　（however　admissible　for　purposes　of　popular　discourse）　the　distinction　between　Order；　or　Permanence；　and　Progress；　employed　to　define　the　qualities　necessary　in　a　government；　is　unscientific　and　incorrect。　　　For；　first；　what　are　Order　and　Progress？　Concerning　Progress　there　is　no　difficulty；　or　none　which　is　apparent　at　first　sight。　When　Progress　is　spoken　of　as　one　of　the　wants　of　human　society；　it　may　be　supposed　to　mean　Improvement。　That　is　a　tolerably　distinct　idea。　But　what　is　Order？　Sometimes　it　means　more；　sometimes　less；　but　hardly　ever　the　whole　of　what　human　society　needs　except　improvement。　　　In　its　narrowest　acceptation　Order　means　Obedience。　A　government　is　said　to　preserve　order　if　it　succeeds　in　getting　itself　obeyed。　But　there　are　different　degrees　of　obedience；　and　it　is　not　every　degree　that　is　commendable。　Only　an　unmitigated　despotism　demands　that　the　individual　citizen　shall　obey　unconditionally　every　mandate　of　persons　in　authority。　We　must　at　least　limit　the　definition　to　such　mandates　as　are　general　and　issued　in　the　deliberate　form　of　laws。　Order；　thus　understood；　expresses；　doubtless；　an　indispensable　attribute　of　government。　Those　who　are　unable　to　make　their　ordinances　obeyed；　cannot　be　said　to　govern。　But　though　a　necessary　condition；　this　is　not　the　object　of　government。　That　it　should　make　itself　obeyed　is　requisite；　in　order　that　it　may　accomplish　some　other　purpose。　We　are　still　to　seek　what　is　this　other　purpose；　which　government　ought　to　fulfil；　abstractedly　from　the　idea　of　improvement；　and　which　has　to　be　fulfilled　in　every　society；　whether　stationary　or　progressive。　　　In　a　sense　somewhat　more　enlarged；　Order　means　the　preservation　of　peace　by　the　cessation　of　private　violence。　Order　is　said　to　exist　where　the　people　of　the　country　have；　as　a　general　rule；　ceased　to　prosecute　their　quarrels　by　private　force；　and　acquired　the　habit　of　referring　the　decision　of　their　disputes　and　the　redress　of　their　injuries　to　the　public　authorities。　But　in　this　larger　use　of　the　term；　as　well　as　in　the　former　narrow　one；　Order　expresses　rather　one　of　the　conditions　of　government；　than　either　its　purpose　or　the　criterion　of　its　excellence。　For　the　habit　may　be　well　established　of　submitting　to　the　government；　and　referring　all　disputed　matters　to　its　authority；　and　yet　the　manner　in　which　the　government　deals　with　those　disputed　matters；　and　with　the　other　things　about　which　it　concerns　itself；　may　differ　by　the　whole　interval　which　divides　the　best　from　the　worst　possible。　　　If　we　intend　to　comprise　in　the　idea　of　Order　all　that　society　requires　from　its　government　which　is　not　included　in　the　idea　of　Progress；　we　must　define　Order　as　the　preservation　of　all　kinds　and　amounts　of　good　which　already　exist；　and　Progress　as　consisting　in　the　increase　of　them。　This　distinction　does　comprehend　in　one　or　the　other　section　everything　which　a　government　can　be　required　to　promote。　But；　thus　understood；　it　affords　no　basis　for　a　philosophy　of　government。　We　cannot　say　that；　in　constituting　a　polity；　certain　provisions　ought　to　be　made　for　Order　and　certain　others　for　Progress；　since　the　conditions　of　Order；　in　the　sense　now　indicated；　and　those　of　Progress；　are　not　opposite；　but　the　same。　The　agencies　which　tend　to　preserve　the　social　good　which　already　exists　are　the　very　same　which　promote　the　increase　of　it；　and　vice　versa：　the　sole　difference　being；　that　a　greater　degree　of　those　agencies　is　required　for　the　latter　purpose　than　for　the　former。　　　What；　for　example；　are　the　qualities　in　the　citizens　individually　which　conduce　most　to　keep　up　the　amount　of　good　conduct；　of　good　management；　of　success　and　prosperity；　which　already　exist　in　society？　Everybody　will　agree　that　those　qualities　are　industry；　integrity；　justice；　and　prudence。　But　are　not　these；　of　all　qualities；　the　most　conducive　to　improvement？　and　is　not　any　growth　of　these　virtues　in　the　community　in　itself　the　greatest　of　improvements？　If　so；　whatever　qualities　in　the　government　are　promotive　of　industry；　integrity；　justice；　and　prudence；　conduce　alike　to　permanence　and　to　progression；　only　there　is　needed　more　of　those　qualities　to　make　the　society　decidedly　progressive　than　merely　to　keep　it　permanent。　　　What；　again；　are　the　particular　attributes　in　human　beings　which　seem　to　have　a　more　especial　reference　to　Progress；　and　do　not　so　directly　suggest　the　ideas　of　Order　and　Preservation？　They　are　chiefly　the　qualities　of　mental　activity；　enterprise；　and　courage。　But　are　not　all　these　qualities　fully　as　much　required　for　preserving　the　good　we　have；　as　for　adding　to　it？　If　there　is　anything　certain　in　human　affairs；　it　is　that　valuable　acquisitions　are　only　to　be　retained　by　the　continuation　of　the　same　energies　which　gained　them。　Things　left　to　take　care　of　themselves　inevitably　decay。　Those　whom　success　induces　to　relax　their　habits　of　care　and　thoughtfulness；　and　their　willingness　to　encounter　disagreeables；　seldom　long　retain　their　good　fortune　at　its　height。　The　mental　attribute　which　seems　exclusively　d