representative government-第46章

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　the　members　for　the　City　of　London　were　chosen　by　the　Aldermen　and　Common　Council；　and　those　for　the　borough　of　Marylebone　avowedly；　as　they　already　are　virtually；　by　the　vestries　of　the　component　parishes。　Even　if　those　bodies；　considered　merely　as　local　boards；　were　far　less　objectionable　than　they　are；　the　qualities　that　would　fit　them　for　the　limited　and　peculiar　duties　of　municipal　or　parochial　aedileship　are　no　guarantee　of　any　special　fitness　to　judge　of　the　comparative　qualifications　of　candidates　for　a　seat　in　Parliament。　They　probably　would　not　fulfil　this　duty　any　better　than　it　is　fulfilled　by　the　inhabitants　voting　directly；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　if　fitness　for　electing　members　of　Parliament　had　to　be　taken　into　consideration　in　selecting　persons　for　the　office　of　vestrymen　or　town　councillors；　many　of　those　who　are　fittest　for　that　more　limited　duty　would　inevitably　be　excluded　from　it；　if　only　by　the　necessity　there　would　be　of　choosing　persons　whose　sentiments　in　general　politics　agreed　with　those　of　the　voters　who　elected　them。　The　mere　indirect　political　influence　of　town…councils　has　already　led　to　a　considerable　perversion　of　municipal　elections　from　their　intended　purpose；　by　making　them　a　matter　of　party　politics。　If　it　were　part　of　the　duty　of　a　man's　book…keeper　or　steward　to　choose　his　physician；　he　would　not　be　likely　to　have　a　better　medical　attendant　than　if　he　chose　one　for　himself；　while　he　would　be　restricted　in　his　choice　of　a　steward　or　book…keeper　to　such　as　might　without　too　great　danger　to　his　health　be　entrusted　with　the　other　office。　　　It　appears；　therefore；　that　every　benefit　of　indirect　election　which　is　attainable　at　all　is　attainable　under　direct；　that　such　of　the　benefits　expected　from　it；　as　would　not　be　obtained　under　direct　election；　will　just　as　much　fail　to　be　obtained　under　indirect；　while　the　latter　has　considerable　disadvantages　peculiar　to　itself。　The　mere　fact　that　it　is　an　additional　and　superfluous　wheel　in　the　machinery　is　no　trifling　objection。　Its　decided　inferiority　as　a　means　of　cultivating　public　spirit　and　political　intelligence　has　already　been　dwelt　upon：　and　if　it　had　any　effective　operation　at　all…　that　is；　if　the　primary　electors　did　to　any　extent　leave　to　their　nominees　the　selection　of　their　parliamentary　representative…　the　voter　would　be　prevented　from　identifying　himself　with　his　member　of　Parliament；　and　the　member　would　feel　a　much　less　active　sense　of　responsibility　to　his　constituents。　In　addition　to　all　this；　the　comparatively　small　number　of　persons　in　whose　hands；　at　last；　the　election　of　a　member　of　Parliament　would　reside；　could　not　but　afford　great　additional　facilities　to　intrigue；　and　to　every　form　of　corruption　compatible　with　the　station　in　life　of　the　electors。　The　constituencies　would　universally　be　reduced；　in　point　of　conveniences　for　bribery；　to　the　condition　of　the　small　boroughs　at　present。　It　would　be　sufficient　to　gain　over　a　small　number　of　persons　to　be　certain　of　being　returned。　If　it　be　said　that　the　electors　would　be　responsible　to　those　who　elected　them；　the　answer　is　obvious；　that；　holding　no　permanent　office；　or　position　in　the　public　eye；　they　would　risk　nothing　by　a　corrupt　vote　except　what　they　would　care　little　for；　not　to　be　appointed　electors　again：　and　the　main　reliance　must　still　be　on　the　penalties　for　bribery；　the　insufficiency　of　which　reliance；　in　small　constituencies；　experience　has　made　notorious　to　all　the　world。　The　evil　would　be　exactly　proportional　to　the　amount　of　discretion　left　to　the　chosen　electors。　The　only　case　in　which　they　would　probably　be　afraid　to　employ　their　vote　for　the　promotion　of　their　personal　interest　would　be　when　they　were　elected　under　an　express　pledge；　as　mere　delegates；　to　carry；　as　it　were；　the　votes　of　their　constituents　to　the　hustings。　The　moment　the　double　stage　of　election　began　to　have　any　effect；　it　would　begin　to　have　a　bad　effect。　And　this　we　shall　find　true　of　the　principle　of　indirect　election　however　applied；　except　in　circumstances　similar　to　those　of　the　election　of　Senators　in　the　United　States。　　　The　best　which　could　be　said　for　this　political　contrivance　that　in　some　states　of　opinion　it　might　be　a　more　practicable　expedient　than　that　of　plural　voting　for　giving　to　every　member　of　the　community　a　vote　of　some　sort；　without　rendering　the　mere　numerical　majority　predominant　in　Parliament：　as；　for　instance；　if　the　present　constituency　of　this　country　were　increased　by　the　addition　of　a　numerous　and　select　portion　of　the　labouring　classes；　elected　by　the　remainder。　Circumstances　might　render　such　a　scheme　a　convenient　mode　of　temporary　compromise；　but　it　does　not　carry　out　any　principle　sufficiently　thoroughly　to　be　likely　to　recommend　itself　to　any　class　of　thinkers　as　a　permanent　arrangement。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　10　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Mode　of　Voting。

　　THE　QUESTION　of　greatest　moment　in　regard　to　modes　of　voting　is　that　of　secrecy　or　publicity；　and　to　this　we　will　at　once　address　ourselves。　　　It　would　be　a　great　mistake　to　make　the　discussion　turn　on　sentimentalities　about　skulking　or　cowardice。　Secrecy　is　justifiable　in　many　cases；　imperative　in　some；　and　it　is　not　cowardice　to　seek　protection　against　evils　which　are　honestly　avoidable。　Nor　can　it　be　reasonably　maintained　that　no　cases　are　conceivable　in　which　secret　voting　is　preferable　to　public。　But　I　must　contend　that　these　cases；　in　affairs　of　a　political　character；　are　the　exception；　not　the　rule。　　　The　present　is　one　of　the　many　instances　in　which；　as　I　have　already　had　occasion　to　remark；　the　spirit　of　an　institution；　the　impression　it　makes　on　the　mind　of　the　citizen；　is　one　of　the　most　important　parts　of　its　operation。　The　spirit　of　vote　by　ballot…　the　interpretation　likely　to　be　put　on　it　in　the　mind　of　an　elector…　is　that　the　suffrage　is　given　to　him　for　himself；　for　his　particular　use　and　benefit；　and　not　as　a　trust　for　the　public。　For　if　it　is　indeed　a　trust；　if　the　public　are　entitled　to　his　vote；　are　not　they　entitled　to　know　his　vote？　This　false　and　pernicious　impression　may　well　be　made　on　the　generality；　since　it　has　been　made　on　most　of　those　who　of　late　years　have　been　conspicuous　advocates　of　the　ballot。　The　doctrine　was　not　so　understood　by　its　earlier　promoters；　but　the　effect　of　a　doctrine　on　the　mind　is　best　shown；　not　in　those　who　form　it；　but　in　those　who　are　formed　by　it。　Mr。　Bright　and　his　school　of　democrats　think　themselves　greatly　concerned　in　maintaining　that　the　franchise　is　what　they　term　a　right；　not　a　trust。　Now　this　one　idea；　taking　root　in　the　general　mind；　does　a　moral　mischief　outweighing　all　the　good　that　the　ballot　could　do；　at　the　highest　possible　estimate　of　it。　In　whatever　way　we　define　or　understand　the　idea　of　a　right；　no　person　can　have　a　right　（except　in　the　purely　legal　sense）　to　power　over　others：　every　such　power；　which　he　is　allowed　to　possess；　is　morally；　in　the　fullest　force　of　the　term；　a　trust。　But　the　exercise　of　any　political　function；　either　as　an　elector　or　as　a　representative；　is　power　over　others。　　　Those　who　say　that　the　suffrage　is　not　a　trust　but　a　right　will　scarcely　accept　the　conclusions　to　which　their　doctrine　leads。　If　it