representative government-第37章

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hardly　ever　be　outvoted；　except　occasionally；　by　the　sectarian　groups；　or　knots　of　men　bound　together　by　a　common　crotchet　who　have　been　already　spoken　of。　　　The　answer　to　this　appears　to　be　conclusive。　No　one　pretends　that　under　Mr。　Hare's　or　any　other　plan　organisation　would　cease　to　be　an　advantage。　Scattered　elements　are　always　at　a　disadvantage　compared　with　organised　bodies。　As　Mr。　Hare's　plan　cannot　alter　the　nature　of　things；　we　must　expect　that　all　parties　or　sections；　great　or　small；　which　possess　organisation；　would　avail　themselves　of　it　to　the　utmost　to　strengthen　their　influence。　But　under　the　existing　system　those　influences　are　everything。　The　scattered　elements　are　absolutely　nothing。　The　voters　who　are　neither　bound　to　the　great　political　nor　to　any　of　the　little　sectarian　divisions　have　no　means　of　making　their　votes　available。　Mr。　Hare's　plan　gives　them　the　means。　They　might　be　more；　or　less；　dexterous　in　using　it。　They　might　obtain　their　share　of　influence；　or　much　less　than　their　share。　But　whatever　they　did　acquire　would　be　clear　gain。　And　when　it　is　assumed　that　every　petty　interest；　or　combination　for　a　petty　object；　would　give　itself　an　organisation；　why　should　we　suppose　that　the　great　interest　of　national　intellect　and　character　would　alone　remain　unorganised？　If　there　would　be　Temperance　tickets；　and　Ragged　School　tickets；　and　the　like；　would　not　one　public…spirited　person　in　a　constituency　be　sufficient　to　put　forth　a　〃personal　merit〃　ticket；　and　circulate　it　through　a　whole　neighbourhood？　And　might　not　a　few　such　persons；　meeting　in　London；　select　from　the　list　of　candidates　the　most　distinguished　names；　without　regard　to　technical　divisions　of　opinion；　and　publish　them　at　a　trifling　expense　through　all　the　constituencies？　It　must　be　remembered　that　the　influence　of　the　two　great　parties；　under　the　present　mode　of　election；　is　unlimited：　in　Mr。　Hare's　scheme　it　would　be　great；　but　confined　within　bounds。　Neither　they；　nor　any　of　the　smaller　knots；　would　be　able　to　elect　more　members　than　in　proportion　to　the　relative　number　of　their　adherents。　The　ticket　system　in　America　operates　under　conditions　the　reverse　of　this。　In　America　electors　vote　for　the　party　ticket；　because　the　election　goes　by　a　mere　majority；　and　a　vote　for　any　one　who　is　certain　not　to　obtain　the　majority　is　thrown　away。　But；　on　Mr。　Hare's　system；　a　vote　given　to　a　person　of　known　worth　has　almost　as　much　chance　of　obtaining　its　object　as　one　given　to　a　party　candidate。　It　might　be　hoped；　therefore；　that　every　Liberal　or　Conservative；　who　was　anything　besides　a　Liberal　or　a　Conservative…　who　had　any　preferences　of　his　own　in　addition　to　those　of　his　party…　would　scratch　through　the　names　of　the　more　obscure　and　insignificant　party　candidates；　and　inscribe　in　their　stead　some　of　the　men　who　are　an　honour　to　the　nation。　And　the　probability　of　this　fact　would　operate　as　a　strong　inducement　with　those　who　drew　up　the　party　lists　not　to　confine　themselves　to　pledged　party　men；　but　to　include　along　with　these；　in　their　respective　tickets；　such　of　the　national　notabilities　as　were　more　in　sympathy　with　their　side　than　with　the　opposite。　　　The　real　difficulty；　for　it　is　not　to　be　dissembled　that　there　is　a　difficulty；　is　that　the　independent　voters；　those　who　are　desirous　of　voting　for　unpatronised　persons　of　merit；　would　be　apt　to　put　down　the　names　of　a　few　such　persons；　and　to　fill　up　the　remainder　of　their　list　with　mere　party　candidates；　thus　helping　to　swell　the　numbers　against　those　by　whom　they　would　prefer　to　be　represented。　There　would　be　an　easy　remedy　for　this；　should　it　be　necessary　to　resort　to　it；　namely；　to　impose　a　limit　to　the　number　of　secondary　or　contingent　votes。　No　voter　is　likely　to　have　an　independent　preference；　grounded　on　knowledge；　for　658；　or　even　for　100　candidates。　There　would　be　little　objection　to　his　being　limited　to　twenty；　fifty；　or　whatever　might　be　the　number　in　the　selection　of　whom　there　was　some　probability　that　his　own　choice　would　be　exercised…that　he　would　vote　as　an　individual；　and　not　as　one　of　the　mere　rank　and　file　of　a　party。　But　even　without　this　restriction；　the　evil　would　be　likely　to　cure　itself　as　soon　as　the　system　came　to　be　well　understood。　To　counteract　it　would　become　a　paramount　object　with　all　the　knots　and　cliques　whose　influence　is　so　much　deprecated。　From　these；　each　in　itself　a　small　minority；　the　word　would　go　forth；　〃Vote　for　your　special　candidates　only；　or　at　least　put　their　names　foremost；　so　as　to　give　them　the　full　chance　which　your　numerical　strength　warrants；　of　obtaining　the　quota　by　means　of　first　votes；　or　without　descending　low　in　the　scale。〃　And　those　voters　who　did　not　belong　to　any　clique　would　profit　by　the　lesson。　　　The　minor　groups　would　have　precisely　the　amount　of　power　which　they　ought　to　have。　The　influence　they　could　exercise　would　be　exactly　that　which　their　number　of　voters　entitled　them　to；　not　a　particle　more；　while　to　ensure　even　that；　they　would　have　a　motive　to　put　up；　as　representatives　of　their　special　objects；　candidates　whose　other　recommendations　would　enable　them　to　obtain　the　suffrages　of　voters　not　of　the　sect　or　clique。　It　is　curious　to　observe　how　the　popular　line　of　argument　in　defence　of　existing　systems　veers　round；　according　to　the　nature　of　the　attack　made　upon　them。　Not　many　years　ago　it　was　the　favourite　argument　in　support　of　the　then　existing　system　of　representation；　that　under　it　all　〃interests〃　or　〃classes〃　were　represented。　And　certainly；　all　interests　or　classes　of　any　importance　ought　to　be　represented；　that　is；　ought　to　have　spokesmen；　or　advocates；　in　Parliament。　But　from　thence　it　was　argued　that　a　system　ought　to　be　supported　which　gave　to　the　partial　interests　not　advocates　merely；　but　the　tribunal　itself。　Now　behold　the　change。　Mr。　Hare's　system　makes　it　impossible　for　partial　interests　to　have　the　command　of　the　tribunal；　but　it　ensures　them　advocates；　and　for　doing　even　this　it　is　reproached。　Because　it　unites　the　good　points　of　class　representation　and　the　good　points　of　numerical　representation；　it　is　attacked　from　both　sides　at　once。　　　But　it　is　not　such　objections　as　these　that　are　the　real　difficulty　in　getting　the　system　accepted；　it　is　the　exaggerated　notion　entertained　of　its　complexity；　and　the　consequent　doubt　whether　it　is　capable　of　being　carried　into　effect。　The　only　complete　answer　to　this　objection　would　be　actual　trial。　When　the　merits　of　the　plan　shall　have　become　more　generally　known；　and　shall　have　gained　for　it　a　wider　support　among　impartial　thinkers；　an　effort　should　be　made　to　obtain　its　introduction　experimentally　in　some　limited　field；　such　as　the　municipal　election　of　some　great　town。　An　opportunity　was　lost　when　the　decision　was　taken　to　divide　the　West　Riding　of　Yorkshire　for　the　purpose　of　giving　it　four　members；　instead　of　trying　the　new　principle；　by　leaving　the　constituency　undivided；　and　allowing　a　candidate　to　be　returned　on　obtaining　either　in　first　or　secondary　votes　a　fourth　part　of　the　whole　number　of　votes　given。　Such　experiments；　would　be　a　very　imperfect　test　of　the　worth　of　the　plan：　but　they　would　be　an　exemplification　of　its　mode　of　working；　they　would　enable　people　to