representative government-第25章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


evails　in　the　nation　makes　itself　manifest　as　prevailing；　and　marshals　its　hosts　in　the　presence　of　the　government；　which　is　thus　enabled　and　compelled　to　give　way　to　it　on　the　mere　manifestation；　without　the　actual　employment；　of　its　strength；　where　statesmen　can　assure　themselves；　far　more　certainly　than　by　any　other　signs；　what　elements　of　opinion　and　power　are　growing；　and　what　declining；　and　are　enabled　to　shape　their　measures　with　some　regard　not　solely　to　present　exigencies；　but　to　tendencies　in　progress。　　　Representative　assemblies　are　often　taunted　by　their　enemies　with　being　places　of　mere　talk　and　bavardage。　There　has　seldom　been　more　misplaced　derision。　I　know　not　how　a　representative　assembly　can　more　usefully　employ　itself　than　in　talk；　when　the　subject　of　talk　is　the　great　public　interests　of　the　country；　and　every　sentence　of　it　represents　the　opinion　either　of　some　important　body　of　persons　in　the　nation；　or　of　an　individual　in　whom　some　such　body　have　reposed　their　confidence。　A　place　where　every　interest　and　shade　of　opinion　in　the　country　can　have　its　cause　even　passionately　pleaded；　in　the　face　of　the　government　and　of　all　other　interests　and　opinions；　can　compel　them　to　listen；　and　either　comply；　or　state　clearly　why　they　do　not；　is　in　itself；　if　it　answered　no　other　purpose；　one　of　the　most　important　political　institutions　that　can　exist　anywhere；　and　one　of　the　foremost　benefits　of　free　government。　Such　〃talking〃　would　never　be　looked　upon　with　disparagement　if　it　were　not　allowed　to　stop　〃doing〃；　which　it　never　would；　if　assemblies　knew　and　acknowledged　that　talking　and　discussion　are　their　proper　business；　while　doing；　as　the　result　of　discussion；　is　the　task　not　of　a　miscellaneous　body；　but　of　individuals　specially　trained　to　it；　that　the　fit　office　of　an　assembly　is　to　see　that　those　individuals　are　honestly　and　intelligently　chosen；　and　to　interfere　no　further　with　them；　except　by　unlimited　latitude　of　suggestion　and　criticism；　and　by　applying　or　withholding　the　final　seal　of　national　assent。　It　is　for　want　of　this　judicious　reserve　that　popular　assemblies　attempt　to　do　what　they　cannot　do　well…　to　govern　and　legislate…　and　provide　no　machinery　but　their　own　for　much　of　it；　when　of　course　every　hour　spent　in　talk　is　an　hour　withdrawn　from　actual　business。　　　But　the　very　fact　which　most　unfits　such　bodies　for　a　Council　of　Legislation　qualifies　them　the　more　for　their　other　office…　namely；　that　they　are　not　a　selection　of　the　greatest　political　minds　in　the　country；　from　whose　opinions　little　could　with　certainty　be　inferred　concerning　those　of　the　nation；　but　are；　when　properly　constituted；　a　fair　sample　of　every　grade　of　intellect　among　the　people　which　is　at　all　entitled　to　a　voice　in　public　affairs。　Their　part　is　to　indicate　wants；　to　be　an　organ　for　popular　demands；　and　a　place　of　adverse　discussion　for　all　opinions　relating　to　public　matters；　both　great　and　small；　and；　along　with　this；　to　check　by　criticism；　and　eventually　by　withdrawing　their　support；　those　high　public　officers　who　really　conduct　the　public　business；　or　who　appoint　those　by　whom　it　is　conducted。　Nothing　but　the　restriction　of　the　function　of　representative　bodies　within　these　rational　limits　will　enable　the　benefits　of　popular　control　to　be　enjoyed　in　conjunction　with　the　no　less　important　requisites　（growing　ever　more　important　as　human　affairs　increase　in　scale　and　in　complexity）　of　skilled　legislation　and　administration。　There　are　no　means　of　combining　these　benefits　except　by　separating　the　functions　which　guarantee　the　one　from　those　which　essentially　require　the　other；　by　disjoining　the　office　of　control　and　criticism　from　the　actual　conduct　of　affairs；　and　devolving　the　former　on　the　representatives　of　the　Many；　while　securing　for　the　latter；　under　strict　responsibility　to　the　nation；　the　acquired　knowledge　and　practised　intelligence　of　a　specially　trained　and　experienced　Few。　　　The　preceding　discussion　of　the　functions　which　ought　to　devolve　on　the　sovereign　representative　assembly　of　the　nation　would　require　to　be　followed　by　an　inquiry　into　those　properly　vested　in　the　minor　representative　bodies；　which　ought　to　exist　for　purposes　that　regard　only　localities。　And　such　an　inquiry　forms　an　essential　part　of　the　present　treatise；　but　many　reasons　require　its　postponement；　until　we　have　considered　the　most　proper　composition　of　the　great　representative　body；　destined　to　control　as　sovereign　the　enactment　of　laws　and　the　administration　of　the　general　affairs　of　the　nation。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　6　　　Of　the　Infirmities　and　Dangers　to　which　Representative　Government　is　Liable。

　　THE　DEFECTS　of　any　form　of　government　may　be　either　negative　or　positive。　It　is　negatively　defective　if　it　does　not　concentrate　in　the　hands　of　the　authorities　power　sufficient　to　fulfil　the　necessary　offices　of　a　government；　or　if　it　does　not　sufficiently　develop　by　exercise　the　active　capacities　and　social　feelings　of　the　individual　citizens。　On　neither　of　these　points　is　it　necessary　that　much　should　be　said　at　this　stage　of　our　inquiry。　　　The　want　of　an　amount　power　in　the　government；　adequate　to　preserve　order　and　allow　of　progress　in　the　people；　is　incident　rather　to　a　wild　and　rude　state　of　society　generally；　than　to　any　particular　form　of　political　union。　When　the　people　are　too　much　attached　to　savage　independence　to　be　tolerant　of　the　amount　of　power　to　which　it　is　for　their　good　that　they　should　be　subject；　the　state　of　society　（as　already　observed）　is　not　yet　ripe　for　representative　government。　When　the　time　for　that　government　has　arrived；　sufficient　power　for　all　needful　purposes　is　sure　to　reside　in　the　sovereign　assembly；　and　if　enough　of　it　is　not　entrusted　to　the　executive；　this　can　only　arise　from　a　jealous　feeling　on　the　part　of　the　assembly　towards　the　administration；　never　likely　to　exist　but　where　the　constitutional　power　of　the　assembly　to　turn　them　out　of　office　has　not　yet　sufficiently　established　itself。　Wherever　that　constitutional　right　is　admitted　in　principle；　and　fully　operative　in　practice；　there　is　no　fear　that　the　assembly　will　not　be　willing　to　trust　its　own　ministers　with　any　amount　of　power　really　desirable；　the　danger　is；　on　the　contrary；　lest　they　should　grant　it　too　ungrudgingly；　and　too　indefinite　in　extent；　since　the　power　of　the　minister　is　the　power　of　the　body　who　make　and　who　keep　him　so。　It　is；　however；　very　likely；　and　is　one　of　the　dangers　of　a　controlling　assembly；　that　it　may　be　lavish　of　powers；　but　afterwards　interfere　with　their　exercise；　may　give　power　by　wholesale；　and　take　it　back　in　detail；　by　multiplied　single　acts　of　interference　in　the　business　of　administration。　The　evils　arising　from　this　assumption　of　the　actual　function　of　governing；　in　lieu　of　that　of　criticising　and　checking　those　who　govern；　have　been　sufficiently　dwelt　upon　in　the　preceding　chapter。　No　safeguard　can　in　the　nature　of　things　be　provided　against　this　improper　meddling；　except　a　strong　and　general　conviction　of　its　injurious　character。　　　The　other　negative　defect　which　may　reside　in　a　government；　that　of　not　bringing　into　sufficient　exercise　the　individual　faculties；　moral；　intellectual；　and　active；　of　th