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ent can a multitude of insignificant political units be welded into a people； with common feelings of cohesion； power enough to protect itself against conquest or foreign aggression； and affairs sufficiently various and considerable of its own to occupy worthily and expand to fit proportions the social and political intelligence of the population。
* Italy； which alone can be quoted as an exception； is only so in regard to the final stage of its transformation。 The more difficult previous advance from the city isolation of Florence； Pisa； or Milan； to the provincial unity of Tuscany or Lombardy； took place in the usual manner。
For these several reasons； kingly government； free from the control （though perhaps strengthened by the support） of representative institutions； is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest stages of any community； not excepting a city…community like those of ancient Greece： where； accordingly； the government of kings； under some real but no ostensible or constitutional control by public opinion； did historically precede by an unknown and probably great duration all free institutions； and gave place at last； during a considerable lapse of time； to oligarchies of a few families。 A hundred other infirmities or short…comings in a people might be pointed out； which pro tanto disqualify them from making the best use of representative government； but in regard to these it is not equally obvious that the government of One or a Few would have any tendency to cure or alleviate the evil。 Strong prejudices of any kind； obstinate adherence to old habits； positive defects of national character； or mere ignorance； and deficiency of mental cultivation； if prevalent in a people； will be in general faithfully reflected in their representative assemblies： and should it happen that the executive administration； the direct management of public affairs； is in the hands of persons comparatively free from these defects； more good would frequently be done by them when not hampered by the necessity of carrying with them the voluntary assent of such bodies。 But the mere position of the rulers does not in these； as it does in the other cases which we have examined； of itself invest them with interests and tendencies operating in the beneficial direction。 From the general weaknesses of the people or of the state of civilisation； the One and his counsellors； or the Few； are not likely to be habitually exempt； except in the case of their being foreigners； belonging to a superior people or a more advanced state of society。 Then； indeed； the rulers may be； to almost any extent； superior in civilisation to those over whom they rule； and subjection to a foreign government of this description； notwithstanding its inevitable evils； is of ten of the greatest advantage to a people； carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress； and clearing away obstacles to improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if the subject population had been left unassisted to its native tendencies and chances。 In a country not under the dominion of foreigners； the only cause adequate to producing similar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary genius。 There have been in history a few of these； who； happily for humanity； have reigned long enough to render some of their improvements permanent； by leaving them under the guardianship of a generation which had grown up under their influence。 Charlemagne may be cited as one instance； Peter the Great is another。 Such examples however are so unfrequent that they can only be classed with the happy accidents which have so often decided at a critical moment whether some leading portion of humanity should make a sudden start； or sink back towards barbarism： chances like the existence of Themistocles at the time of the Persian invasion； or of the first or third William of Orange。 It would be absurd to construct institutions for the mere purpose of taking advantage of such possibilities； especially as men of this calibre； in any distinguished position； do not require despotic power to enable them to exert great influence； as is evidenced by the three last mentioned。 The case most requiring consideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon one in which a small but leading portion of the population； from difference of race； more civilised origin； or other peculiarities of circumstance； are markedly superior in civilisation and general character to the remainder。 Under those conditions； government by the representatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of much of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilisation of the superior ranks； while government by the representatives of those ranks would probably rivet the degradation of the multitude； and leave them no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one of the most valuable elements of future advancement。 The best prospect of improvement for a people thus composed lies in the existence of a constitutionally unlimited； or at least a practically preponderant； authority in the chief ruler of the dominant class。 He alone has by his position an interest in raising and improving the mass of whom he is not jealous； as a counterpoise to his associates of whom he is。 And if fortunate circumstances place beside him； not as controllers but as subordinates； a body representative of the superior caste； which by its objections and questionings； and by its occasional outbreaks of spirit； keeps alive habits of collective resistance； and may admit of being； in time and by degrees； expanded into a really national representation （which is in substance the history of the English Parliament）； the nation has then the most favourable prospects of improvement which can well occur to a community thus circumstanced and constituted。 Among the tendencies which； without absolutely rendering a people unfit for representative government； seriously incapacitate them from reaping the full benefit of it； one deserves particular notice。 There are two states of the inclinations； intrinsically very different； but which have something in common； by virtue of which they often coincide in the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of nations： one is； the desire to exercise power over others； the other is disinclination to have power exercised over themselves。 The difference between different portions of mankind in the relative strength of these two dispositions is one of the most important elements in their history。 There are nations in whom the passion for governing others is so much stronger than the desire of personal independence； that for the mere shadow of the one they are found ready to sacrifice the whole of the other。 Each one of their number is willing； like the private soldier in an army； to abdicate his personal freedom of action into the hands of his general； provided the army is triumphant and victorious； and he is able to flatter himself that he is one of a conquering host； though the notion that he has himself any share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion。 A government strictly limited in its powers and attributions； required to hold its hands f