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r adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement。 As they range lower and lower in development； that form of government will be； generally speaking； less suitable to them； though this is not true universally： for the adaptation of a people to representative government does not depend so much upon the place they occupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which they possess certain special requisites； requisites； however； so closely connected with their degree of general advancement； that any variation between the two is rather the exception than the rule。 Let us examine at what point in the descending series representative government ceases altogether to be admissible； either through its own unfitness； or the superior fitness of some other regimen。 First； then； representative； like any other government； must be unsuitable in any case in which it cannot permanently subsist… i。e。 in which it does not fulfil the three fundamental conditions enumerated in the first chapter。 These were… 1。 That the people should be willing to receive it。 2。 That they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation。 3。 That they should be willing and able to fulfil the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them。 The willingness of the people to accept representative government only becomes a practical question when an enlightened ruler； or a foreign nation or nations who have gained power over the country； are disposed to offer it the boon。 To individual reformers the question is almost irrelevant； since； if no other objection can be made to their enterprise than that the opinion of the nation is not yet on their side； they have the ready and proper answer； that to bring it over to their side is the very end they aim at。 When opinion is really adverse； its hostility is usually to the fact of change； rather than to representative government in itself。 The contrary case is not indeed unexampled； there has sometimes been a religious repugnance to any limitation of the power of a particular line of rulers； but； in general； the doctrine of passive obedience meant only submission to the will of the powers that be； whether monarchical or popular。 In any case in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at all likely to be made； indifference to it； and inability to understand its processes and requirements； rather than positive opposition； are the obstacles to be expected。 These； however； are as fatal； and may be as hard to be got rid of； as actual aversion； it being easier； in most cases； to change the direction of an active feeling； than to create one in a state previously passive。 When a people have no sufficient value for； and attachment to； a representative constitution； they have next to no chance of retaining it。 In every country； the executive is the branch of the government which wields the immediate power； and is in direct contact with the public； to it； principally； the hopes and fears of individuals are directed； and by it both the benefits； and the terrors and prestige； of government are mainly represented to the public eye。 Unless； therefore； the authorities whose office it is to check the executive are backed by an effective opinion and feeling in the country； the executive has always the means of setting them aside； or compelling them to subservience； and is sure to be well supported in doing so。 Representative institutions necessarily depend for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in case of their being endangered。 If too little valued for this； they seldom obtain a footing at all； and if they do； are almost sure to be overthrown； as soon as the head of the government； or any party leader who can muster force for a coup de main； is willing to run some small risk for absolute power。 These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a representative government。 The third is； when the people want either the will or the capacity to fulfil the part which belongs to them in a representative constitution。 When nobody； or only some small fraction； feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the State necessary to the formation of a public opinion； the electors will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their private interest； or the interest of their locality； or of some one with whom they are connected as adherents or dependents。 The small class who； in this state of public feeling； gain the command of the representative body； for the most part use it solely as a means of seeking their fortune。 if the executive is weak； the country is distracted by mere struggles for place； if strong； it makes itself despotic； at the cheap price of appeasing the representatives； or such of them as are capable of giving trouble； by a share of the spoil； and the only fruit produced by national representation is； that in addition to those who really govern； there is an assembly quartered on the public； and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are interested is at all likely to be removed。 When； however； the evil stops here； the price may be worth paying； for the publicity and discussion which； though not an invariable； are a natural accompaniment of any； even nominal； representation。 In the modern Kingdom of Greece； for example；* it can hardly be doubted； that the placehunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly； though they contribute little or nothing directly to good government； nor even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive； yet keep up the idea of popular rights； and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the press which exists in that country。 This benefit； however； is entirely dependent on the co…existence with the popular body of an hereditary king。 If； instead of struggling for the favours of the chief ruler； these selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place itself； they would certainly； as in Spanish America； keep the country in a state of chronic revolution and civil war。 A despotism； not even legal； but of illegal violence； would be alternately exercised by a succession of political adventurers； and the name and forms of representation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from attaining the stability and security by which alone its evils can be mitigated； or its few advantages realised。
* Written before the salutary revolution of 1862； which； provoked by popular disgust at the system of governing by corruption； and the general demoralisation of political men； has opened to that rapidly improving people a new and hopeful chance of real constitutional government。
The preceding are the cases in which representative government cannot permanently exist。 There are others in which it possibly might exist； but in which some other form of government would be preferable。 These are principally when the people； in order to advance in civilisation； have some lesson to learn； some habit not yet acquired； to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an impediment。 The most obvious of these cases is the one already considered； in which the people have still to learn the first lesson of civilisation； that of obedience。 A