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the Constitution； all money…bills； and some other laws。 … …Neither
the monarch nor the electors of the Assembly are to convoke the
Assembly； he has no voice in or oversight of the details of its
formation； the electors are to meet together and vote without his
summons or supervision。 Once the Assembly is elected he can neither
adjourn nor dissolve it。 He cannot even propose a law；＇2＇ per…
mission is only granted to him 〃to invite it to take a subject into
consideration。〃 He is limited to his executive duties； and still
more； a sort of wall is built up between him and the Assembly； and
the opening in it； by which each could take the other's hand； is
carefully closed up。 The deputies are forbidden to become ministers
throughout the term of their service and for two years afterwards。
This is because fears are entertained that they might be corrupted
through contact with the Court； and； again； whoever the ministers
might be； there is no disposition to accept their ascendancy。＇3＇ If
one of them is admitted into the Assembly it is not for the purpose
of giving advice； but to furnish information； reply to
interrogatories； and make protestations of his zeal in humble terms
and in a dubious position。＇4＇ By virtue of being a royal agent he
is under suspicion like the King himself； and he is sequestered in
his bureau as the King is sequestered in his palace。… Such is the
spirit of the Constitution： by force of the theory； and the better
to secure a separation of the powers；＇5＇ a common understanding
between them is for ever rendered impossible； and to make up for
this impossibility there remains nothing but to make one the master
and the other the clerk。
This they did not fail to do； and for greater security； the latter
is made an honorary clerk； The executive power is conferred on him
nominally and in appearance； he does not possess it in fact； care
having been taken to place it in other hands。 … In effect； all
executive agents and all secondary and local powers are elective。
The King has no voice； directly or indirectly； in the choice of
judges； public prosecutors； bishops； curés； collectors and assessors
of the taxes； commissaries of police； district and departmental
administrators； mayors； and municipal officers。 At most； should an
administrator violate a law； he may annul his acts and suspend him；
but the Assembly； the superior power； has the right to cancel this
suspension。 … As to the armed force； of which he is supposed to be
the commander…in…chief； this escapes from him entirely： the National
Guard is not to receive orders from him； the gendarmerie and the
troops are bound to respond to the requisitions of the municipal
authorities； whom the King can neither select nor displace： in
short； local action of any kind … that is to say； all effective
action … is denied to him。 … The executive instrument is purposely
destroyed。 The connection which existed between the wheels of the
extremities and the central shaft is broken； and henceforth；
incapable of distributing its energy； this shaft； in the hands of
the monarch； stands still or else turns to no purpose。 The King；
〃supreme head of the general administration； of the army； and of the
navy； guardian of public peace and order； hereditary representative
of the nation；〃 is without the means； in spite of his lofty titles；
of directly applying his pretended powers； of causing a schedule of
assessments to be drawn up in a refractory commune； of compelling
payment by a delinquent tax…payer； of enforcing the free circulation
of a convoy of grain； of executing the judgment of a court； of
suppressing an outbreak； or of securing protection to persons and
property。 For he can bring no constraint to bear on the agents who
are declared to be subordinate to him； he has no resources but those
of warning and persuasion。 He sends to each Departmental Assembly
the decrees which he has sanctioned； requesting it to transmit them
and cause them to be carried out； he receives its correspondence and
bestows his censure or approval … and that is all。 He is merely a
powerless medium of communication； a herald or public advertiser； a
sort of central echo； sonorous and empty； to which news is brought；
and from which laws depart； to spread abroad like a common rumor。
Such as he is； and thus diminished； he is still considered to be too
strong。 He is deprived of the right of pardon； 〃which severs the
last artery of monarchical government。〃＇6＇ All sorts of precautions
are taken against him。 He cannot declare war without a decree of
the Assembly； he is obliged to bring war to an end on the decree of
the Assembly； he cannot make a treaty of peace； an alliance； or a
commercial treaty； without the ratification of these by the
Assembly。 It is expressly declared that he is to nominate but two…
thirds of the rear…admirals； one…half of the lieutenant…generals；
field…marshals； captains of Vessels and colonels of the gendarmerie；
one…third of the colonels and lieutenant…colonels of the line； and a
sixth of the naval lieutenants。 He must not allow troops to stay or
pass within 30；000 yards of the Assembly。 His guard must not
consist of more than 1；800 men； duly verified； and protected against
his seductions by the civil oath。 The heir…presumptive must not
leave the country without the Assembly's assent。 It is the Assembly
which is to regulate by law the education of his son during
minority。 … All these precautions are accompanied with threats。
There are against him five possible causes of dethronement； against
his responsible Ministers； eight causes for condemnation to from
twelve to twenty years of constraint； and eight grounds for
condemnations to death。＇7＇ Everywhere between the lines of the
Constitution； we read the constant disposition to assume an attitude
of defense； the secret dread of treachery； the conviction that
executive power； of whatever kind； is in its nature inimical to the
public welfare。 … For withholding the nomination of judges； the
reason alleged is that 〃the Court and the Ministers are the most
contemptible portion of the nation。〃＇8＇ If the nomination of
Ministers is conceded； it is on the ground that〃 Ministers appointed
by the people would necessarily be too highly esteemed。〃 The
principle is that 〃the legislative body alone must possess the
confidence of the people；〃 that royal authority corrupts its
depository； and that executive power is always tempted to commit
abuses and to engage in conspiracies。 If it is provided for in the
Constitution it is with regret； through the necessity of the case；
and on the condition of its being trammeled by impediments； it will
prove so much the less baneful in proportion as it is restrained；
guarded； threatened； and denounced。 … A position of this kind is
manifestly intolerable； and only a man as passive as Louis XVI。
could have put up with it。 Do what he will； however； he cannot make
it a tenable one。 In vain does he scrupulous