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despising wealth in competition with insult or injury； enterprising
and energetic as any nation on earth； these circumstances render it
impossible that France and the U。S。 can continue long friends when
they meet in so irritable a position。 They as well as we must be
blind if they do not see this； and we must be very improvident if we
do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis。 The day that
France takes possession of N。 Orleans fixes the sentence which is to
restrain her forever within her low water mark。 It seals the union
of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession
of the ocean。 From that moment we must marry ourselves to the
British fleet and nation。 We must turn all our attentions to a
maritime force； for which our resources place us on very high
grounds： and having formed and cemented together a power which may
render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France；
make the first cannon； which shall be fired in Europe the signal for
tearing up any settlement she may have made； and for holding the two
continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the
united British and American nations。 This is not a state of things
we seek or desire。 It is one which this measure； if adopted by
France； forces on us； as necessarily as any other cause； by the laws
of nature； brings on its necessary effect。 It is not from a fear of
France that we deprecate this measure proposed by her。 For however
greater her force is than ours compared in the abstract； it is
nothing in comparison of ours when to be exerted on our soil。 But it
is from a sincere love of peace； and a firm persuasion that bound to
France by the interests and the strong sympathies still existing in
the minds of our citizens； and holding relative positions which
ensure their continuance we are secure of a long course of peace。
Whereas the change of friends； which will be rendered necessary if
France changes that position； embarks us necessarily as a belligerent
power in the first war of Europe。 In that case France will have held
possession of New Orleans during the interval of a peace； long or
short； at the end of which it will be wrested from her。 Will this
short…lived possession have been an equivalent to her for the
transfer of such a weight into the scale of her enemy？ Will not the
amalgamation of a young； thriving； nation continue to that enemy the
health and force which are at present so evidently on the decline？
And will a few years possession of N。 Orleans add equally to the
strength of France？ She may say she needs Louisiana for the supply
of her West Indies。 She does not need it in time of peace。 And in
war she could not depend on them because they would be so easily
intercepted。 I should suppose that all these considerations might in
some proper form be brought into view of the government of France。
Tho' stated by us； it ought not to give offence； because we do not
bring them forward as a menace； but as consequences not controulable
by us； but inevitable from the course of things。 We mention them not
as things which we desire by any means； but as things we deprecate；
and we beseech a friend to look forward and to prevent them for our
common interests。
If France considers Louisiana however as indispensable for her
views she might perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements
which might reconcile it to our interests。 If anything could do this
it would be the ceding to us the island of New Orleans and the
Floridas。 This would certainly in a great degree remove the causes
of jarring and irritation between us； and perhaps for such a length
of time as might produce other means of making the measure
permanently conciliatory to our interests and friendships。 It would
at any rate relieve us from the necessity of taking immediate
measures for countervailing such an operation by arrangements in
another quarter。 Still we should consider N。 Orleans and the
Floridas as equivalent for the risk of a quarrel with France produced
by her vicinage。 I have no doubt you have urged these considerations
on every proper occasion with the government where you are。 They are
such as must have effect if you can find the means of producing
thorough reflection on them by that government。 The idea here is
that the troops sent to St。 Domingo； were to proceed to Louisiana
after finishing their work in that island。 If this were the
arrangement； it will give you time to return again and again to the
charge； for the conquest of St。 Domingo will not be a short work。 It
will take considerable time to wear down a great number of souldiers。
Every eye in the U。S。 is now fixed on this affair of Louisiana。
Perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war has produced more uneasy
sensations through the body of the nation。 Notwithstanding temporary
bickerings have taken place with France； she has still a strong hold
on the affections of our citizens generally。 I have thought it not
amiss； by way of supplement to the letters of the Secretary of State
to write you this private one to impress you with the importance we
affix to this transaction。 I pray you to cherish Dupont。 He has the
best dispositions for the continuance of friendship between the two
nations； and perhaps you may be able to make a good use of him。
Accept assurances of my affectionate esteem and high consideration。
DRY…DOCKING THE NAVY
_To Benjamin H。 Latrobe_
_Washington； Nov。 2； 1802_
DEAR SIR The placing of a navy in a state of perfect
preservation； so that at the beginning of a subsequent war it shall
be as sound as at the end of the preceding one when laid up； and the
lessening the expence of repairs； perpetually necessary while they
lie in the water； are objects of the first importance to a nation
which to a certain degree must be maritime。 The dry docks of Europe；
being below the level of tide water； are very expensive in their
construction and in the manner of keeping them clear of water； and
are only practicable at all where they have high tides： insomuch that
no nation has ever proposed to lay up their whole navy in dry docks。
But if the dry dock were above the level of tide water； and there be
any means of raising the vessels up into them； and of covering the
dock with a roof； thus withdrawn from the rot and the sun； they would
last as long as the interior timbers； doors and floors of a house。
The vast command of running water at this place； at different heights
from 30 to 200 feet above tide water； enables us to effect this
desirable object by forming a lower bason into which the tide water
shall float the vessel and then have its gates closed； and adjoining
to this； but 24 feet higher； an upper bason 275 feet wide； and 800 f。
long （sufficient to contain 12 frigates） into which running water can
be introduced from above； so that filling both basons （as in a lock）
the