按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
subjects； others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions； others
have fostered enmities against themselves； others have laid themselves out
to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their
governments； some have built fortresses； some have overthrown and
destroyed them。 And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of
these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a
decision has to be made； nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as
the matter of itself will admit。
2。 There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects； rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them； because； by
arming them； those arms become yours； those men who were distrusted
become faithful； and those who were faithful are kept so； and your
subjects become your adherents。 And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed； yet when those whom you do arm are benefited； the others can be
handled more freely； and this difference in their treatment； which they
quite understand； makes the former your dependents； and the latter；
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward； excuse you。 But when you disarm
them； you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them； either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty； and either of these opinions breeds
hatred against you。 And because you cannot remain unarmed； it follows
that you turn to mercenaries； which are of the character already shown；
even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you
against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects。 Therefore； as I have said；
a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms。 Histories
are full of examples。 But when a prince acquires a new state； which he
adds as a province to his old one； then it is necessary to disarm the men of
that state； except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it； and
these again； with time and opportunity； should be rendered soft and
85
… Page 86…
The Prince
effeminate； and matters should be managed in such a way that all the
armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state
were living near you。
3。 Our forefathers； and those who were reckoned wise； were
accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and
Pisa by fortresses； and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of
their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily。 This
may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
balanced； but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to…
day； because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use； rather it is
certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are
quickly lost； because the weakest party will always assist the outside
forces and the other will not be able to resist。 The Venetians； moved； as I
believe； by the above reasons； fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions
in their tributary cities； and although they never allowed them to come to
bloodshed； yet they nursed these disputes amongst them； so that the
citizens； distracted by their differences； should not unite against them。
Which； as we saw； did not afterwards turn out as expected； because； after
the rout at Vaila； one party at once took courage and seized the state。 Such
methods argue； therefore； weakness in the prince； because these factions
will never be permitted in a vigorous principality； such methods for
enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times
of peace； but if war comes this policy proves fallacious。
4。 Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted； and therefore
fortune； especially when she desires to make a new prince great； who has a
greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one； causes enemies to
arise and form designs against him； in order that he may have the
opportunity of overcoming them； and by them to mount higher； as by a
ladder which his enemies have raised。 For this reason many consider that a
wise prince； when he has the opportunity； ought with craft to foster some
animosity against himself； so that； having crushed it； his renown may rise
higher。
5。 Princes； especially new ones； have found more fidelity and
86
… Page 87…
The Prince
assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted
than among those who in the beginning were trusted。 Pandolfo Petrucci；
Prince of Siena； ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than
by others。 But on this question one cannot speak generally； for it varies so
much with the individual； I will only say this； that those men who at the
commencement of a princedom have been hostile； if they are of a
description to need assistance to support themselves； can always be gained
over with the greatest ease； and they will be tightly held to serve the prince
with fidelity； inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to
cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them； and
thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who；
serving him in too much security； may neglect his affairs。 And since the
matter demands it； I must not fail to warn a prince； who by means of secret
favours has acquired a new state； that he must well consider the reasons
which induced those to favour him who did so； and if it be not a natural
affection towards him； but only discontent with their government； then he
will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty； for it will be
impossible to satisfy them。 And weighing well the reasons for this in those
examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs； we shall
find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were
contented under the former government； and are t