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person could prove the absolute like to become unlike； or the absolute
unlike to become like； that； in my opinion； would indeed be a
wonder； but there is nothing extraordinary； Zeno； in showing that
the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience
both。 Nor； again； if a person were to show that all is one by
partaking of one； and at the same time many by partaking of many；
would that be very astonishing。 But if he were to show me that the
absolute one was many； or the absolute many one； I should be truly
amazed。 And so of all the rest： I should be surprised to hear that the
natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities； but not if a
person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one。 When he
wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and
a left side； and a front and a back； and an upper and a lower half；
for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude； when； on the other
hand； he wants to prove that I am one； he will say； that we who are
here assembled are seven； and that I am one and partake of the one。 In
both instances he proves his case。 So again； if a person shows that
such things as wood； stones； and the like； being many are also one； we
admit that he shows the coexistence the one and many； but he does
not show that the many are one or the one many； he is uttering not a
paradox but a truism。 If however； as I just now suggested； some one
were to abstract simple notions of like； unlike； one； many； rest；
motion； and similar ideas； and then to show that these admit of
admixture and separation in themselves； I should be very much
astonished。 This part of the argument appears to be treated by you；
Zeno； in a very spirited manner； but； as I was saying； I should be far
more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are
apprehended by reason； the same puzzle and entanglement which you have
shown to exist in visible objects。
While Socrates was speaking； Pythodorus thought that Parmenides
and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the
argument； but still they gave the closest attention and often looked
at one another； and smiled as if in admiration of him。 When he had
finished； Parmenides expressed their feelings in the following words：…
Socrates； he said； I admire the bent of your mind towards
philosophy； tell me now； was this your own distinction between ideas
in themselves and the things which partake of them？ and do you think
that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we
possess； and of the one and many； and of the other things which Zeno
mentioned？
I think that there are such ideas； said Socrates。
Parmenides proceeded： And would you also make absolute ideas of
the just and the beautiful and the good； and of all that class？
Yes； he said； I should。
And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other
human creatures； or of fire and water？
I am often undecided； Parmenides； as to whether I ought to include
them or not。
And would you feel equally undecided； Socrates； about things of
which the mention may provoke a smile？…I mean such things as hair；
mud； dirt； or anything else which is vile and paltry； would you
suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual
objects with which we come into contact； or not？
Certainly not； said Socrates； visible things like these are such
as they appear to us； and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity
in assuming any idea of them； although I sometimes get disturbed；
and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea； but then
again； when I have taken up this position； I run away； because I am
afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense； and
perish； and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking；
and occupy myself with them。
Yes； Socrates； said Parmenides； that is because you are still young；
the time will come； if I am not mistaken； when philosophy will have
a firmer grasp of you； and then you will not despise even the
meanest things； at your age； you are too much disposed to regard
opinions of men。 But I should like to know whether you mean that there
are certain ideas of which all other things partake； and from which
they derive their names； that similars； for example； become similar；
because they partake of similarity； and great things become great；
because they partake of greatness； and that just and beautiful
things become just and beautiful； because they partake of justice
and beauty？
Yes； certainly； said Socrates that is my meaning。
Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or
else of a part of the idea？ Can there be any other mode of
participation？
There cannot be； he said。
Then do you think that the whole idea is one； and yet； being one； is
in each one of the many？
Why not； Parmenides？ said Socrates。
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same
time in many separate individuals； and will therefore be in a state of
separation from itself。
Nay； but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in
many places at once； and yet continuous with itself； in this way
each idea may be one； and the same in all at the same time。
I like your way； Socrates； of making one in many places at once。 You
mean to say； that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of
men； there would be one whole including many…is not that your meaning？
I think so。
And would you say that the whole sail includes each man； or a part
of it only； and different parts different men？
The latter。
Then； Socrates； the ideas themselves will be divisible； and things
which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the
whole idea existing in each of them？
That seems to follow。
Then would you like to say； Socrates； that the one idea is really
divisible and yet remains one？
Certainly not； he said。
Suppose that you divide absolute greatness； and that of the many
great things； each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness
less than absolute greatness…is that conceivable？
No。
Or will each equal thing； if possessing some small portion of
equality less than absolute equality； be equal to some other thing
by virtue of that portion only？
Impossible。
Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness； this is but a
part of the small； and therefore the absolutely small is greater； if
the absolutely small be greater； that to which the part of the small
is added will be smaller and not greater than before。
How absurd！
Then in what way； Socrates； will all things participate in the
ideas； if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or
wholes？
Indeed； he