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INTRODUCTION TO
A CONTRIBUTION TO A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Written between end of August and middle September 1857。
Marx intended this to be the Introduction to his
_Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy_ （1859）；
but； as his Preface to that work notes； he decided to
omit it。
The unfinished rough draft； which was found among Marx's
papers after his death。 First published 1903； in _Die
Neue Zeit_。 Would become the first manuscript in the
_Grundrisse_。
I。 PRODUCTION； CONSUMPTION； DISTRIBUTION； EXCHANGE （CIRCULATION）
3。 The Method of Political Economy
When examining a given country from the standpoint of political economy；
we begin with its population； the division of the population into
classes； town and country； the sea； the different branches of
production； export and import； annual production and consumption；
prices； etc。
It would seem to be the proper thing to start with the real and concrete
elements； with the actual preconditions e。g。； to start in the sphere
of the whole economy with population which forms the basis and the
subject of the whole social process of production。 Closer consideration
shows； however； that this is wrong。 Population is an abstraction if；
for instance； one disregards the classes of which it is composed。 These
classes； in turn； remain empty terms if one does not know the factors on
which they depend e。g。； wage…labor； capital； and so on。 These
presuppose exchange； division of labor； prices； etc。 For example；
capital without wage…labor； without value； money； prices； etc。； is
nothing。 If one were to take population as the point of departure； it
would be a very vague notion of a complex whole and through closer
definition； one would arrive analytically at increasingly simple
concepts； from imaginary concrete terms； one would move to more and more
tenuous abstractions； until one reached the most simple definition。
From there； it would be necessary to make the journey again in the
opposite direction until one arrived once more at the concept of
population； which is this time not a vague notion of a whole； but a
totality comprising many determinations and relations。 The first course
is the historical one taken by political economy at tis inception。 The
17th century economists； for example； always took as their
starting…point the living organism； the population； the nation； the
state； several states； etc。； but analysis led them always； in the end；
to the discovery of a few decisive abstract； general relations （such as
division of labor； money； and value）。 When these separate factors were
more or less clearly deduced and established； economic systems were
evolved which from simple concepts； such as labor； division of labor；
demand； exchange value； advanced to categories like state； international
exchange and world market。 This latter is obviously the correct
scientific method。 The concrete concept is concrete because it is a
synthesis of many definitions； thus representing the unity of diverse
aspects。 It appears； therefore； in reasoning as a summing…up； a result；
and not as the starting…point although it is the real point of
origin； and thus also the point of origin of perception and imagination。
The first procedure attenuates meaningful images to abstract
definitions； the second leads from abstract definitions by way of
reasoning to the reproduction of the concrete situation。 Hegel
accordingly conceived the illusory idea that the real world is the
result of thinking； which causes its own synthesis； its own deepening；
and its own movement； whereas the method of advancing from the abstract
to the concrete is simply the way in which thinking assimilates the
concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category。 This is；
however； by no means the process of evolution of the concrete world
itself。 For example； the simplest economic category e。g。； exchange
value presupposes population； a population moreover which produces
under definite conditions； as well as a distinct kind of family； or
community； or state； etc。 Exchange value cannot exist except as an
abstract； _unilateral_ relation of an already existing concrete organic
whole。 But exchange value as a category leads an antediluvian
existence。 Thus； to consciousness and this comprises philosophical
consciousness which regards the comprehending mind as the real man；
and hence the comprehended world as such as the only real world； to
consciousness； therefore； the evolution of categories appears as the
actual process of production which； unfortunately； is given an
impulse from outside whose result is the world； and this （which is
however again a tautological expression） is true in so far as the
concrete totality regarded as a conceptual mental totality； as a mental
fact； is indeed a product of thinking； of comprehension； but it is by no
means a product of the idea which evolves spontaneously and who think
proceeds outside and above perception and imagination； but is the result
of the assimilation and transformation of perceptions and images into
concepts。 The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is
a product of the thinking intellect； which assimilates the world in the
only way open to it； a way which differs from the artistic； religious
and practically intelligent assimilation of the world。 The concrete
subject remains outside the intellect and independent of it that is；
so long as the intellect adopts a purely speculative； purely theoretical
attitude。 The subject； society； must always be envisaged therefore as
the precondition of comprehension； even when the theoretical method is
employed。
But have not these simple categories also an independent historical or
natural existence preceding that of the more concrete ones？ This
depends。 Hegel； for example； correctly takes ownership the simplest
legal relation of the subject as the point of departure of the
philosophy of law。 No ownership exists； however； before the family or
the relations of master and servant are evolved； and these are much more
concrete relations。 It would； on the other hand； be correct to say that
families and entire tribes exist which have as yet only _possessions_
and not _property_。 The simpler category appears； thus； as a relation
of simple family or tribal communities to property。 In societies which
have reached a higher stage； the category appears as a comparatively
simple relation existing in a more advanced community。 The concrete
substratum underlying the relation of ownership is； however； always
presupposed。 One can conceive an individual savage who has possessions；
possession in this case； however； is not a legal relation。 It is
incorrect that in the course of historical development possession gave
rise to the family。 On the contrary； possession always presupposes this
〃more concrete category〃。 One may； neve